[NCUC-DISCUSS] IGP comment on WSIS+20
Anriette Esterhuysen
anriette at apc.org
Thu Jul 17 17:01:36 CEST 2025
Dear Milton and team
Thanks for writing this and thanks for sharing it. I support much of
it, perhaps even most, but not all :)
Some reactions, inline, below, preceded by my initials (AE) and in
italics. I also have some questions for IGP.
Anriette
*1. What are the most important achievements arising from WSIS
that should be highlighted in the Zero Draft? *
The most significant and enduring achievement of WSIS is the
establishment of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). As a cornerstone
of the WSIS vision, the IGF has played a pivotal role in advancing
multistakeholder cooperation on critical technology and policy issues
central to the Information Society. By operationalizing the principles
outlined in the Geneva Declaration and Tunis Agenda, the IGF has
fostered inclusive, global dialogue for over two decades.
Its success is evident in the sustained participation of diverse
stakeholders worldwide and the proliferation of national and regional
IGFs—now exceeding 175 initiatives—demonstrating its far-reaching
impact. Contrary to the characterization in the /Elements/ paper as
merely an annual event, the IGF sustains a dynamic, year-round ecosystem
of collaboration through intersessional programs (such as Dynamic
Coalitions, Best Practice Forums, and Policy Networks) and a robust
network of local, youth, and regional Internet governance efforts.
This model of multistakeholder governance, pioneered by the IGF, remains
one of WSIS’s most transformative outcomes and should be prominently
recognized in the Zero Draft.
A/E: Agree that IGF is a very important outcome, as is the
multistakeholoder approach. Agree also that the Elements paper does not
do the IGF ecosystems, including NRIs justice./
/However, I do think there are other important outcomes of the WSIS,
such as governments realising the value of the internet and increased
investment in access to infrastructure and capacity building - even
though not nearly enough. Implementing the WSIS action lines has not
been a perfect process but it has brought benefits to millions of
people. Without WSIS this process would have started much later in many
places and not progressed to the extent it has.
/
*2. What are the most important challenges to the achievement of
WSIS outcomes to date and in the future that need to be addressed
in the Zero Draft?*
We see the absence of a permanent mandate for IGF as a critical
challenge that should be addressed in the zero draft. We also view the
disconnect between the WSIS Forum and the discussions that happen at IGF
as another challenge.
/AE: Agree that the IGF not having a renewed long term or permanent
mandate is a huge challenge. But I would say that lack of commitment to
financing digital inclusion is an even greater challenge. Added to this
is the lack of sequencing. Digital inclusion as in "meaningful
connectivity" is not just one priority among many. Internet use and
penetration is actually shrinking in some parts of the world and the
divide is growing bigger as people need more, better, faster access and
smarter devices to meaningfully connect./
/Another huge challenges which is not addressed is the concentration of
power in the hands of a few big tech companies, and when it comes to
access, most people's dependency on a still relatively uncompetitive
mobile telecoms sector. /
*3. What are the most important priorities for action to achieve
the WSIS vision of a ‘people-centred, inclusive and
development-oriented Information Society’ in the future, taking
into account emerging trends? *
Internet Governance
The IGF remains vital but must evolve to reflect its broader role in
digital governance, not just Internet governance. Its structure should
shift toward a true multistakeholder partnership, reducing unilateral UN
control and fostering equitable collaboration among governments, civil
society, the private sector, and technical communities.
The WSIS process should move beyond “enhanced cooperation”—a term that,
in 2005, served as diplomatic cover for intergovernmental disputes over
DNS root oversight. The 2016 IANA transition resolved that debate by
ending U.S. control, making the term obsolete. Instead, prioritization
should be given to:
* Creating stronger integration with National and Regional IGFs (NRIGFs)
* Ensuring IGF programming integrates bottom-up proposals from NRIGFs
and other members of the public.
/AE: I don't see the UN as having 'unilateral control' over the IGF.
What about the MAG, the host country, the Secretariat, organisers of DCs
and Policy Networks and Best Practice Forums and of course NRIs. I
believe that the link to the UN remains important and creates an
incentive for governments to participate in national and regional IGFs.
Without a strong UN link I fear that many NRIs will die, even if slowly./
/I also don't agree fully on enhanced cooperation. Yes, the IANA
transition resolved one aspect of that debate, but for G77 countries,
many of them anyway, the concern that they have less opportunity and
influence in internet-related public policy shaping and making remains./
/I do agree with the prioritisation of 'stronger integration' with NRIs
but I think this is easier said than done. It has been tried.. and is
still not working well enough. I would like to hear how you think it can
be made more effective.
/
/Agree with you on the bottom up process./
/I am curious to hear how IGP feels about a more 'focused' IGF agenda?
That is a concern the MAG faces every year, based on input from the
community. /
Human Rights and the Information Society
The /Elements/ paper’s approach to human rights is deeply flawed,
prioritizing state control over individual empowerment. While it
correctly affirms that offline rights must apply online—including
freedoms of expression and assembly—its operational language undermines
these principles.
Problematic elements include:
* Vague calls for “actions against abusive uses of ICTs”, which risk
legitimizing censorship.
* Overemphasis on permissible restrictions (e.g., for “national
security” or “public morals”), framing rights as conditional rather
than fundamental.
* Conflating ethics with repression, enabling governments to weaponize
“integrity” narratives to justify surveillance and suppression.
This approach contradicts WSIS’s people-centered vision. Human rights
frameworks exist to constrain state power, not to justify its expansion.
The WSIS+20 review must reject this regressive rhetoric and instead:
* Unambiguously center freedom of expression as non-negotiable.
* Address digital rights threats (e.g., censorship, mass surveillance)
without legitimizing them under the guise of “ethics.”
/AE: Agree that human rights not given nearly enough priority. But,
when you say freedom of expression should be non-negotiable, are you
saying there should be no measures to address hate speech or online
harms? I agree that 'integrity' narratives are weaponised to justify
repression, but the monetisation of false, fake, extremist content by
platforms is equally problematic.
/
/I agree very strongly with your points on ethics. The Action Line on
ethics should be amended to explicitly refer to human rights law and
standard/s.
*4, What additional themes/issues, if any, should be included in
the Elements Paper?*
The Digital Economy deserves greater emphasis in the WSIS+20 review, as
it serves as the foundation for many critical issues currently addressed
in isolation. A thriving global digital economy depends on the
cooperative, multistakeholder frameworks that the UN and IGF are
uniquely positioned to advance. Key sub-themes—such as ICT for
development, social and cultural progress, bridging digital divides,
data governance, and financial inclusion—are intrinsically linked to the
growth of a digital economy built on Internet-based infrastructure. For
example:
* Private sector investments in connectivity (e.g., broadband
expansion, cloud services) have driven accessibility.
* E-commerce, digital banking, and cryptocurrencies have
revolutionized payment systems.
* Cross-border flows of capital and knowledge have accelerated
innovation, including in AI and other transformative technologies.
However, the rise of digital sovereignty policies threatens this
progress by imposing fragmented, territorial restrictions on data,
services, hardware (e.g., semiconductors), and digital trade. Such
measures risk stifling the very cooperation needed to sustain inclusive
growth. The Elements Paper should:
1. Explicitly recognize the digital economy as a cross-cutting
priority, central to achieving WSIS goals.
2. Reject digital sovereignty frameworks that undermine global
interoperability and economic development.
By anchoring these issues in the broader digital economy narrative, the
WSIS+20 review can better align its objectives with today’s
technological and economic realities.
/AE: I agree that digital economy, and that includes data and trade,
should get more attention. I don't agree that blanket rejection of any
kind of digital sovereignty frameworks should be foundational - I think
it depends on the issue and context, but I definitely agree that the
development of a digital economy that benefits all countries more
equally as opposed to the status quo where the benefits and power are
concentrated in the hands of a few countries with existing power and
resources in terms of their capability in the sector. /
*5. Do you wish to comment on particular themes/issues/paragraphs
in the Elements Paper? *
The WSIS+20 review represents a critical opportunity to ensure coherence
between WSIS implementation and the Global Digital Compact (GDC).
We emphasize three key points:
1. Avoid Parallel Processes: The GDC must not develop as a competing or
duplicative multilateral framework, but rather as a complementary
initiative reinforcing WSIS principles. The GDC’s 70 commitments
span critical areas: from closing digital divides, promoting and
protecting human rights, connecting schools and hospitals, to
facilitating data flows with trust, and misinformation and
disinformation, intersecting with the WSIS Action Lines at many points.
2. Institutional Alignment: Should the UN Office for Development and
Technology (UN ODET) assume GDC implementation responsibilities, its
mandate must explicitly support and enhance existing WSIS
mechanisms, particularly the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
3. Operational Synergy: All GDC implementation activities should be
designed to strengthen rather than duplicate WSIS implementation
structures, maintaining the IGF’s central role in multistakeholder
digital governance.
This approach will prevent fragmentation of global digital governance
efforts while preserving two decades of institutional knowledge and
stakeholder engagement developed through the WSIS process.
/AE: I agree with all this in principle but I would privilege
integration of the GDC into the existing WSIS framework because it
exists at country and regional level which has enabled more meaningful
participation for non-state actors than is possible at global level./
*6. What suggestions do you have to support the development of the
WSIS framework?*
To strengthen the WSIS framework, we propose that the UN Office for
Digital and Emerging Technology (UN ODET) establish structured
multistakeholder dialogues to develop consensus on digital governance
norms, focusing on pol that have maticy issuesured within IGF
discussions. However, any such mechanism must address the historical
exclusion of non-state actors in UN-led processes. Critical reforms
should include implementing robust metrics to evaluate WSIS Action Line
outcomes and ensure greater accountability. For the IGF specifically, we
recommend rebalancing the MAG’s composition to ensure equitable
stakeholder representation while allowing communities to directly
appoint their representatives. The Leadership Panel should be eliminated
to reduce hierarchies, and parliamentary participants should be better
integrated into core programming. Financially, the IGF should diversify
its funding sources with a target of securing 50% from non-UN entities
within three years. Finally, oversight of the IGF’s mandate should shift
from the UN General Assembly to the IGF itself, with the CSTD retaining
an advisory role to maintain member state input while reducing
bureaucratic burdens. These changes would modernize the WSIS framework
while preserving its multistakeholder foundation.
/AE: Here I don't agree fully. While strengthening its ability to have
structured multistakeholder dialogues is a good idea I am not sure why
ODET should lead the process of developing consensus on the huge range
of digital governance norms that are discussed at the IGF. Why not embed
this in the existing WSIS architecture through a strengthened IGF and
the existing UN agencies that have specialised capacity in key areas,
such as the Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, UNESCO, UNDP
and the ITU? And others that are not sufficiently part of the process,
such as UNIDIR for example. When it comes to norms there is so much that
has been done already -- by OHCHR/ HRC, UNESCO, ITU, WIPO, what is
needed is to consolidate this into some kind of framework of internet
governance principles - an activity that is part of the IGF's mandate./
/Also don't forget that human rights norms, laws and standards that are
part of the international human rights are enforceable and the UN
framework provides a framework for this. It is not perfect, but it is a
hell of a lot better than having no accountability framework at all.
/
/Your idea of shifting oversight of the IGF's mandate away from the
General Assembly is interesting - but also complicated. If it rests on
delinking the IGF from the WSIS process I think it would in the long run
turn the IGF into just a conference and one that is mostly relevant to
developing countries, excluding those that are still struggling with
building digital infrastructure and capacity. Also keep in mind that
CSTD falls under ECOSOC which falls under the General Assembly.. so I am
not sure your proposal really changes the current arrangement.
/
/As for the IGF diversifying its funding sources.. that is always a good
thing. But the contribution from UN entities is way, way below 50%
already so I am not sure what the target of /"securing 50% from non-UN
entities within three years" /means. Many people are in fact saying the
opposite.. that the IGF should be getting more predictable funding from
the UN rather than relying more or less completely on voluntary
contributions from outside the UN./
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