[NCUC-DISCUSS] NCUC Delegate to the 2015 NomCom

Tamir Israel tisrael at cippic.ca
Tue Aug 26 17:15:20 CEST 2014


Thanks Carlos -- very helpful to have this comparative understanding
(even if we don't end up launching our ICANN board revolution ; P).

I *did* forget to mention the top down component in CIRA, which is that
the CEO, a Canadian Gov rep and John Demco (who used to run .CA out of
his office at University of British Columbia in true postel style) each
have permanent non-voting board seats. These are non-voting seats, but
not non-influencial ones, so there is some level of top down.

I doubt there is much enthusiasm for this type of reform right now, but
if it ever does come up, a simple way to do it might be how Ed suggests,
but more broadly, the use of non-profits as stakeholder governance
bodies is problematic in general. We use them here in Canada in a number
of contexts, but it's always an exercise in fitting square pegs into
triangle-shaped holes. I think someone needs to invent a new entity
altogether, something closer to an IGO but w/out the state-run
overtones. Anyone can feel free to add this to their extensive to-do
list : D

Best,
Tamir

On 26/08/2014 8:12 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote:
> Thanks, Tamir. Great to know the details of the process. I think there
> will be many examples to learn from if we do engage in trying to propose
> something really new for ICANN.
>
> The case of CGI.br is quite special, in that it was created by the
> government in 1995, and some gov ministries constituted a top-down
> nominating committee to choose all reps (gov and non gov). The big
> change happened in 2003, when all non-govs (12 out of 21 members)
> started to be chosen by their own constituencies. But domain name
> holders as such have no vote and no say, except through the CS, business
> and tech comm stakeholders' representatives.
>
> fraternal regards
>
> --c.a.
>
> On 08/25/2014 10:58 AM, Tamir Israel wrote:
>> On 25/08/2014 8:55 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote:
>>> In the case of ccTLDs there are some good straightforward examples --
>>> CIRA's board is elected by the domain name holders, not registrars
>>> (although its contracts -- both CIRA's and the domain holder -- are with
>>> registrars).
>> CIRA takes a 2-tiered approach (with members at the ultimate end of
>> both). There's a nomination committee, which is appointed by the
>> existing board. It nominates x number of candidates. All .CA members
>> then vote on the nominated candidates to fill any vacant nominated
>> candidate seats on the board (9 out of 12 board seats are allocated to
>> nominated candidates).
>>
>> In addition, any .CA owner can put themselves forward as a candidate. If
>> they receive at least 20 shows of support from other .CA owners, they
>> become official candidates. All .CA members can then vote on the member
>> candidates to fill any vacant member candidate seats on the board (3/12
>> board seats are allocated to member directors).
>>
>> We don't have a mechanism for direct stakeholder input analogous to the
>> GNSO tho. It seems that in the ICANN context, given the centrality of
>> the GNSO and the stakeholder model, you would want closer and more
>> direct connection between the nomination committee and stakeholder
>> groups. In addition, given that ICANN controls an important public
>> resource, I'm not sure control of the board should be limited to members
>> (as in .*** owners).
>>
>> Also, while I'm here, +1 for brenden : )
>>
>> Best,
>> Tamir
>>




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