Fwd: [governance] Verisign seizes .com domain registered via foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities

Sat Mar 10 18:14:23 CET 2012

Authority lies where people say it does. Historically, IANA could have
befell elsewhere (gTLD-MOU, BWG, not to mention competing root
alliances) and as a matter of present-day political reality, I would
argue that NTIA authority on the root, which is variously asserted, is
weak. If enough people agree that it lies elsewhere, it does. Such is
the politics of "authority". It's never an immovable reified object, but
always an intersubjectively recasted thing that needs both assertions
and recognition. The interface between assertion and recognition, is an
elastic political space which we call legitimacy.

Nicolas

On 3/10/2012 11:58 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote:
> Hmmm... "authority assertion" of the root lies with NTIA... Icann
> continues to be just a contractor, whatever the nice "affirmations of
> commitments" say. So in the last instance, domains within TLDs
> operated by US-based companies (as registries) can be seized, and
> there may be nothing that registrars can do. Disastrous, but true.
>
> --c.a.
>
> On 03/10/2012 02:06 AM, Nicolas Adam wrote:
>> Disregarding the thorny issue that it must be done sometimes for botnet
>> and such, and just concentrating on the
>> political/jurisdictional/authority/flow-down-contract issue:
>>
>> IANA/Icann can *assert* *its* authority on the root file and say to VS
>> something like: don't disrupt DNS connectivity in other parts of the
>> world via changes in the root. You may safely respond to local querries
>> within your technical capability, but this is off limit.
>>
>> I'm not arguing now that this would necessarily be sound policy (it
>> would clearly be regarding IPR, less clearly with spambots), but it's
>> got everything to do with authority assertion (or lack thereof) on the
>> root.
>>
>> I will be happy to learn be being contradicted in 7 different ways.
>>
>> Nicolas
>>
>> On 3/9/2012 9:50 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>>> I am no fan of the domain name seizures but there is an unfortunate
>>> level of confusion about what is really at issue here.
>>> The domain seizures imposed on VeriSign actually have nothing to do
>>> with the fact that the US controls the authoritative root zone file.
>>> Rather, they are allowed by the fact that the domains are registered
>>> under .com, and the .com registry falls under US jurisdiction. We
>>> could delegate root zone authority to the ITU, the United Nations, the
>>> IGF, Russia, China or the IGP and it wouldn't make one bit of
>>> difference to the ability of the FBI, ICE, or any other US authority
>>> to order Verisign to disable a second level domain registered under
>>> .com. Only Verisign, the operator of the .com registry, can without
>>> the consent of the registrant redirect a dns query from the nameserver
>>> for foo.com to ice.gov.
>>>
>>> IANA cannot do this. ICANN cannot do this.
>>>
>>> Just so you know.
>>>
>>> --MM
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU] On Behalf Of
>>>> Adam Peake
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 2:01 AM
>>>> To: NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU
>>>> Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] Fwd: [governance] Verisign seizes .com
>>>> domain registered via foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities
>>>>
>>>> Anyone know how many of the take-downs have used Verisign?
>>>>
>>>> And wonder how many of the new TLD applicants have selected US-based
>>>> technical providers.
>>>>
>>>> During WSIS civil society frequently commented on US' unilateral
>>>> control
>>>> of the root as unacceptable. Many submissions made, can only find this
>>>> now... from 2005:
>>>>
>>>> "We would like to underscore that unilateral control of the root zone
>>>> file is a public policy issue. We agree with WGIG that in future no
>>>> single government should have a pre-eminent role in global
>>>> governance of
>>>> the logical infrastructure of the Internet."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps time to make it a public policy issue again? With the AoC and
>>>> other improvements the US has been pretty good since WSIS. These name
>>>> seizures are a nasty step back.
>>>>
>>>> Adam
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Nicolas Adam<nickolas.adam at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> There is also this article [tech dirt] that is very interesting, that
>>>>> goes along the one that you referenced below [blog easyDNS] (and that
>>>>> is well worth highlighting a second time for this crowd).
>>>>>
>>>>> This goes straight to the heart of ICANN's legitimacy. It goes to who
>>>>> they cater to, who they don't oppose, to the limit of its autonomy,
>>>>> what perception of itself it conveys through its actions and
>>>> inactions, etc.
>>>>> I don't pretend to have a ready diplomatic/political fix that ICANN
>>>>> can just roll-out as a guide going forward. But it seems to me that
>>>>> its political choices, prudent and wise as they may seem to the ones
>>>>> in charge (or the ones preparing Dan's one-pagers), are unfortunately
>>>>> the hallmark of a lack of identity and the signs of a sure downfall.
>>>>>
>>>>> No new type of political body like ICANN can survive without making
>>>> its bed.
>>>>> Somehow, somewhere. How it manages itself now, marvelously
>>>>> noncommittally, only serves at alienating stakeholders that could
>>>>> otherwise turn out to support it. And it never gets anything to show
>>>>> for it from the ones that it punctually accommodate.
>>>>>
>>>>> I see this as a very important Board-level long term issue, that
>>>>> needs
>>>>> strong leadership and attention. The users (writ large) will not
>>>>> tolerate ICANN if it cannot provide consistency and predictability,
>>>>> that is, an identity.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nicolas
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 3/1/2012 8:17 AM, Adam Peake wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this new, or just more of what ICE has been doing before. I don't
>>>>> remember if Verisign's been used in this way before. Clip from the
>>>>> blog post (link below)
>>>>>
>>>>> "We all know that with some US-based Registrars (*cough* Godaddy
>>>>> *cough*), all it takes is a badge out of a box of crackerjacks and
>>>>> you
>>>>> have the authority to fax in a takedown request which has a good shot
>>>>> at being honoured. We also know that some non-US registrars, it takes
>>>>> a lot more "due process-iness" to get a domain taken down.
>>>>>
>>>>> But now, none of that matters, because in this case the State of
>>>>> Maryland simply issued a warrant to .com operator Verisign, (who is
>>>>> headquartered in California) who then duly updated the rootzone for
>>>>> .com with two new NS records for bodog.com which now redirect the
>>>>> domain to the takedown page."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Adam
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>> From: michael gurstein<gurstein at gmail.com>
>>>>> Date: Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 9:47 PM
>>>>> Subject: [governance] Verisign seizes .com domain registered via
>>>>> foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities
>>>>> To: governance at lists.igcaucus.org
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://blog2.easydns.org/2012/02/29/verisign-seizes-com-domain-registe
>>>>>
>>>>> red-vi a-foreign-registrar-on-behalf-of-us-authorities/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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