Follow-Up to NCSG Charter-Structure Questions

[Brenden Kuerbis]

Meeting Name: *NCUC: Follow-Up Meeting on NCSG Charter-Structure*  Start
Date and Time: *02/27/2009 04:30 PM EST*  End Date and Time: *02/27/2009
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On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 4:17 PM, Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org> wrote:

> Great!  How about 16:30 (EST) on Friday the 27th for the call?  That is
> 21:30 UTC on Friday the 27th.
>
> Does that time work for folks who want to join?
>
> Using Elluminate again would be terrific, thank you.
>
> All best,
> Robin
>
>
>
> On Feb 23, 2009, at 12:13 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote:
>
> Hi, Robin
>
> I would like to join the call if possible. My preference would be for
> meeting on Friday, as I'll be traveling to MC on Saturday.  But either way I
> can setup an Elluminate session, so those who can't be there can listen to
> the recording.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Brenden Kuerbis
> Internet Governance Project
> http://internetgovernance.org
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 2:08 PM, Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org> wrote:
>
>>  Thanks, Milton.  This sounds like a good approach and should address
>> some of those concerns from staff.
>>
>> How about a call on either this Fri., or Sat. to try to hammer this out
>> further?
>>
>> I'm less optimistic that it will pacify those who are fixated on
>> controlling counsel seats, but is an inclusive approach that will empower
>> minority voices within the constituency.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Robin
>>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 23, 2009, at 6:33 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>>
>>  Robin
>> I will try to have a draft that incorporates the reasonable staff comments
>> and some new ideas (thresholds for working group formation) that came out of
>> our discussions with ALAC/NARALO people by the middle of this week.  If we
>> could schedule a call sometime late evening EST this week I could squeeze it
>> into my schedule.
>>
>> Let me explain this new idea. Brenden Kuerbis actually came up with it,
>> and it solves many problems related to minority representation under an
>> integrated structure. It should appeal to "dissenters" within NCUC such as
>> Cheryl Preston.
>>
>> The idea is that when a certain threshold of the membership or the policy
>> committee wants to form a GNSO Working Group on a policy issue dear to them,
>> then ALL NCSG Council representatives must vote to support the formation of
>> that WG.
>>
>> Example: A constituency or faction within the NCUC wants to promote policy
>> X. The first step is to get the GNSO Council to create a WG on X. Once a WG
>> is formed, any supporters of X can join that WG and work on the issue, it
>> doesn't matter whether they have a Council seat or not. So we have a vote in
>> the SG or the Policy Committee on whether to form the WG and if a certain
>> low threshold is met - say, 20% - then ALL of the NCSG Councillors are
>> obliged to vote for the formation of that WG, whether they like the idea or
>> not.
>>
>> Of course, forming the WG does not mean that the supporters of X will get
>> exactly the policy they want. But NCSG cannot guarantee that in any event --
>> all the other factions, constituencies and SGs will be involved in any WG.
>> It does, however, guarantee that minorities within the NCSG have a chance to
>> get their ideas past the Council and into the WG phase.
>>
>> Milton Mueller
>> Professor, Syracuse University School of Information Studies
>> XS4All Professor, Delft University of Technology
>> ------------------------------
>> Internet Governance Project:
>> http://internetgovernance.org
>>
>>
>>  ------------------------------
>> *From:* Robin Gross [mailto:robin at ipjustice.org <robin at ipjustice.org>]
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 22, 2009 7:27 PM
>> *To:* Milton L Mueller; NCUC-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU
>> *Subject:* Re: [NCUC-DISCUSS] FW: Follow-Up to NCSG Charter-Structure
>> Questions
>>
>> Thanks, Milton.
>> You are right that we have to continue to remind the ICANN staff and board
>> that the constituency model that the staff is proposing encourages
>> stake-holder groups to be in a perpetual power struggle within themselves
>> (and between constituencies) to hold on to counsel seats.  The way staff is
>> trying to organize the GNSO it appears they are trying to disempower the
>> GNSO even further by requiring all energies to be consumed in un-ending
>> administrative tasks and political battles.   Too bad.  This "GNSO reform"
>> was a real opportunity for ICANN to reform some of its more nasty tendencies
>> (like staff dominating the board, the GNSO, etc.)
>>
>> We should revise our draft SG proposal for submission by 1 March (taking
>> into account the feedback we've received so more).
>>
>> Should we schedule a call this week to discuss the submission further?
>>  Any suggestions?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Robin
>>
>>
>>
>>  On Feb 21, 2009, at 9:46 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>>
>>  Hello, all
>> You will remember that I sent questions to the staff questioning the
>> practicality of certain aspects of their favored model for a NCSG. The good
>> news is that they have taken the inquiry seriously and responded. The bad
>> news is that, as I feared, the only way to make their favored model work
>> requires enormous amounts of organizational overhead – an additional
>> bureaucratic overlay that creates not only complexity but the possibility of
>> top-down manipulation of constituency election results. Interestingly, the
>> more workable approaches start to look a lot like the integrated election
>> process we already proposed. Read for yourself.
>>   ------------------------------
>>  *From:* Robert Hoggarth [mailto:robert.hoggarth at icann.org<robert.hoggarth at icann.org>
>> ]
>>
>> Milton:
>>
>> Thank you for your recent email (below) in which you posed a couple of
>> questions for the Staff concerning the new Stakeholder Group model.  The
>> questions are challenging and we have done our best to provide what we think
>> are reasonable recommendations as to how they might be addressed.
>>
>> *Q1: How does a constituency-based model produced balanced geographic
>> representation in Council seats?
>> *
>> We envision geographic diversity as a representational responsibility of
>> each Stakeholder Group (SG) in fulfilling its role of allocating GNSO
>> Council seats to member Constituencies.  We are currently working with the
>> General Counsel to draft Bylaw amendments consistent with that approach.
>>
>> Using your example, if the SG has six seats and three Constituencies, it
>> may choose to allocate seats evenly although it would not be required to do
>> so.  In the simplest case, if there are two seats assigned to each
>> Constituency, the SG would alert its members that it needs to have all five
>> geographic regions represented with no more than two Councilors coming from
>> the same one.  In order to accomplish that goal, the SG might ask certain
>> Constituencies to produce its candidates from a limited set of geographic
>> regions.
>> Another option might be to solicit a larger candidate pool, e.g. three
>> from each Constituency or nine total (voted from within), and choose those
>> six that best satisfy the SG's geographic diversity needs.  In a situation
>> where the number of Council seats to be allocated is not evenly divisible,
>> the SG might decide to designate certain seats to specific geographic
>> regions and candidates from various Constituencies could campaign for those
>> available slots.
>> MM commentary: note the last line: "designating certain seats to specific
>> geographic regions" and allowing "candidates from various Constituencies
>> [to] campaign for those available slots" sounds suspiciously close to an
>> integrated, Stakeholder Group-wide election, which is what we proposed! In
>> other words, Council candidates would have to appeal for votes from across
>> the entire SG, not just inside their constituency
>> We believe that the SG, working collaboratively with its member
>> Constituencies, can continue to ensure that its GNSO Councilors reflect a
>> profile consistent with the organization's geographic diversity goals.
>>
>> *Q2: How does a constituency-based model apportion Council seats among
>> Constituencies when they are of different size?
>> *
>> While the decisions may be challenging, we think that one principal role
>> of the SG's leadership team[ 1] <see footnote below> is to establish the
>> very criteria (and methodology) that would allow such apportionment
>> determinations to be made.  A SG could utilize factors other than size, for
>> example, geographic diversity and possibly others.  To take a concrete
>> example, if there were six seats and four constituencies, the SG could end
>> up with a 2-2-1-1 or 3-1-1-1 configuration utilizing whatever
>> decision-making criteria it adopted (and had approved, via its Charter, by
>> the Board).  You raise the possibility of gaming the system and, of course,
>> such behavior is theoretically possible in any proposed model including your
>> own.  In that circumstance, the SG leadership should reexamine its
>> methodology and adjust, as necessary, to minimize any undesirable outcomes.
>>  Once the seats are allocated, if a new constituency is subsequently
>> admitted to the SG by the Board, we recommend that, at its next annual
>> cycle, the SG reallocate seats taking into consideration five members vs.
>> four.  The most likely Council member configuration, given the limited
>> combinations, would be 2-1-1-1.  We do make the tacit assumption that any
>> Constituency approved by the Board would have satisfied ICANN's fundamental
>> stakeholder representational requirements and, thus, would be entitled to at
>> least one seat on the Council.
>>
>> In terms of oversight, we believe that the Board's role will be not only
>> to ensure that each of the SG Charters is structured in a fair, open, and
>> transparent manner; but, it will also likely monitor SG activities,
>> especially in the period immediately after initial implementation.
>>
>> We would be happy to continue discussing this matter with you and, of
>> course, we would welcome another set of questions if there are still
>> unresolved issues in your mind.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Denise Michel
>>
>> [1] <#_ftnref> *We would envision an Execeutive Committee comprised of
>> one delegate from each recognized Constituency.
>> *
>> MM comment: This proposal creates a potential nightmare. It requires a
>> group of delegates from each constituency to fight among themselves, with no
>> pre-set criteria, to decide who gets how many Council seats. Unacceptable,
>> and unnecessary. In our proposal, size differences among constituencies are
>> automatically reflected in voting totals for Council seats. There is no need
>> for top-down, negotiated allocations. Those negotiations create all the
>> rigidities that the Board Governance Committee was trying to get rid of, and
>> present all kinds of opportunities for abuse. Even when they are not abused,
>> they will consume enormous amounts of time. It is apparent that ICANN's
>> professional staff – which gets paid to do this work – still does not
>> appreciate the way in which imposing additional layers of bureaucracy and a
>> constant need to contend and negotiation for power inside a SG saps the
>> energy of noncommercial groups and prevents them from doing the real work of
>> policy development. I ask for your support to tell the staff that this is
>> not an acceptable option.
>>
>> **
>>  *MM's Original Email of 6 February, 2009:
>> *
>> Robert, Denise and Ken
>>
>> Thanks a lot for your valuable feedback on our draft Charter (v4.0). It is
>> clear that we are making progress, although there is a long way to go.
>>
>> In respect to some of your questions or requests for explanation, let me
>> turn the tables on you a bit. The presumption in many of these exchanges is
>> that there's something complicated or "different" about what we are
>> proposing, and that the "constituency-based SG model" is straightforward and
>> poses no problems. In many ways, however, an integrated SG structure is far
>> simpler, and we have no idea how a constituency model would work even if we
>> thought it desirable to implement it.
>>
>> Let me give you two examples. I will pose them in the form of questions
>> because it genuinely would like to have answers from you or any other
>> defender of the constituency-based SG model.
>>
>> *Q1: How does a constituency-based model produced balanced geographic
>> representation in Council seats?
>> *
>> Think about this. Let's say there are 3 independent constituencies in a
>> SG, and each of them elects 2 Council seats without reference to the other.
>> So Constituency A elects (in accord with its own geog. representation rules)
>> a person from North American and a person from Latin America; Constituency B
>> elects a person from North America and a person from Latin America; and
>> Constituency C elects a person from North America and another from Latin
>> America. End result: each constituency has, on its own, produced as much
>> geographic diversity as it possibly could, and yet the end result could be
>> that only two world regions are represented on the Council.
>>
>> I would be very interested to see how you propose to avoid this problem
>> while staying in the constituency model.
>>
>> An integrated SG model, by contrast, can impose proportions on the six
>> seats as a whole, thereby ensuring that most if not all regions are
>> represented.
>>
>> *Q2: How does a constituency-based model apportion Council seats among
>> Constituencies when they are of different size?
>> *
>> Let's suppose there is an "old constituency" that has 50 members, and a
>> "new" constituency that starts and gets recognized by the Board, and has
>> only 10 initial members (or even less). How many Council seats does each
>> constituency get? Do they inherently get the same number of seats simply by
>> virtue of the fact that they are constituencies? Or does their
>> representation on the Council reflect their relative size? If the latter,
>> who decides what allocation principle is used, when there is no
>> pre-established SG decision-making method? And once Council seats depend on
>> membership size, what is to stop one constituency from extending membership
>> in an overly easy way, regardless of appropriate criteria, to inflate its
>> relative size? Will the Board monitor this?
>>
>> These questions are not impossible to answer, but they obviously impose a
>> very complex layer of organization, monitoring and procedure that an
>> integrated SG model does not have to worry about.
>> Frankly, Bob and Denise, I could produce about a dozen more questions like
>> this. But let's see how you do with these two first.
>>
>> My point is to put this discussion of SG models on a more solid footing
>> with an equal burden of proof. If you can convince us that a
>> constituency-based model handles such basic and obvious issues as well as an
>> integrated model,we'd be more inclined to change our view.
>> --MM
>>  ------------------------------
>>  [1] <#_ftnref> *We would envision an Execeutive Committee comprised of
>> one delegate from each recognized Constituency.*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> IP JUSTICE
>> Robin Gross, Executive Director
>> 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA  94117  USA
>> p: +1-415-553-6261    f: +1-415-462-6451
>> w: http://www.ipjustice.org     e: robin at ipjustice.org
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> IP JUSTICE
>> Robin Gross, Executive Director
>> 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA  94117  USA
>> p: +1-415-553-6261    f: +1-415-462-6451
>> w: http://www.ipjustice.org     e: robin at ipjustice.org
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
> IP JUSTICE
> Robin Gross, Executive Director
> 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA  94117  USA
> p: +1-415-553-6261    f: +1-415-462-6451
> w: http://www.ipjustice.org     e: robin at ipjustice.org
>
>
>
>
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