[ncdnhc-discuss] ICANN reform plan

[James Love]

The new ICANN reform plan is out and on the web here: 
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm

These are some quite observations.....  Jamie

* 
The ICANN reform committee has now formally reduced the role of individuals, 
who were supposed to elect 9 of 19 ICANN board members in the White Paper, 
but now will have 1 of 19 members on a NomCom, that elects 8 of 15 board 
members.

* 
A new $.25 per domain is proposed to fund ICANN.

* 	The ICANN "General Assembly" will no longer be allowed to vote on anything, 
including its own chair or on advisory matters.  "The GNSO GA should take no 
votes."

* 
The independent review is gone, replaced by loser pays binding arbitration 
over bylaws violations.  ICANN can change its bylaws, articles of 
incorporation or just about anything else by a 2/3 vote of the board.

* 	The ccTLDs are to create a new CNSO supporting organization, where votes 
are conditioned upon signing contracts to fund and obey ICANN.  The CNSO 
will be reduced to an advisory board to the ICANN board, which will have the 
power to override CNSO decisions.  The CNSO will not be allowed to 
separately incorporate.

* 	The PSO (protocol supporting organization) is eliminated.  The ASO (the 
numbering SO) is retained.


    BOARD SELECTION

This is how the ICANN board will be chosen, according to the new June 
proposal by the ICANN Reform Committee.   Alejandro Pisanty and his 
colleagues on the reform committee have presented a system that is more 
accountable than some of the options presented earlier (such as those that 
would have the board appoint the all of members of the NomCom), but it also 
has some features that will be controversial (including its strong and broad 
policy making authority, which will not be constrained by requirements to 
reach consensus), is more centralized than CPTech has recommended, and many 
details have to be worked out on the NomCom.  (All the power is now with the 
ICANN board, which treats bodies like the CNSO and DNSO as advisory bodies).

The ICANN board will have considerable influence on the election of new 
board members, by appointing persons directly to the "NomCom" that elects 
board members, and by appointing persons directly to the board of the GNSO, 
and by having the NomCom elect 1/3 the members of the CNSO.

Six ICANN board members would be elected 2 each from the GNSO, the CNSO, and 
the ASO.  The CEO would continue to have a vote on the board.
The proposed ICANN NomCom would will elect 8 of the 15 ICANN board members, 
and 3 of the GNSO board members, and an unspecified number of CNSO board 
members.

The CNSO (the new supporting organization for ccTLDs), will no longer be run 
as a trade association for the ccTLD registries, the ICANN board will change 
the makeup of its board.  Only ccTLDs who sign contracts and pay money to 
ICANN can vote and they will have about 2/3 of the CNSO board.  The NomCom 
will choose the remainder of the voting members of the CNSO board.  The CNSO 
will not be allowed to separately incorporate.  The CNSO will not be a 
policy "making" body.  It will just make recommendations to the ICANN board, 
which will have all of the policy making power.

Here is the blueprint for the NomCom.  It will have 19 members, some of whom 
will be independent, but some will be appointed by the board, including the 
Chair of the NomCom.  The registrar/registry community gets three members. 
  ISPs, numbering organizations and large and small business get 4 members. 
     IP organizations get 1 member.  Academic and consumer and civil society 
groups get 2 votes.  Individuals (individual domain holders holders), who 
were supposed to elect 9 ICANN *board* members in the White Paper not will 
get 1 of 19 members of the NomCom, so they are greatly reduced in influence. 
    The IETF, the TAC and GAC get three members.  Four "unaffiliated public 
interest persons" round out the NomCom membership, apparently appointed by 
the board.

http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm

ICANN NomCom

The NomCom would initially be a 19-member body composed of delegates (not 
representatives) appointed by the following constituencies:

     * gTLD registries (1)
     * gTLD registrars (1)
     * ccTLD registries (1)
     * Address registries (1)
     * Internet service providers (1)
     * Large business users (1)
     * Small business users (1)
     * IP organizations (1)
     * Academic and other public entities (1)
     * Consumer and civil society group[s (1)
     * Individual domain name holders (1)
     * IAB/IETF (1)
     * TAC (1)
     * GAC (1)
     * Unaffiliated public interest persons (4)

In addition there would be a Chair appointed by the Board and 2 non-voting 
liaisons, one from each of the RSSAC and the SAC. The above represents a 
workable balance among providers, users, technical and public interests.

Selection

As indicated, all but the Chair of the NomCom would be appointed by the 
applicable constituency. In the cases where there is today no clearly 
defined constituency, the Board would initially appoint the delegates 
following consultation with bodies that can credibly be seen to speak for 
the affected groups. This process would be more clearly defined as part of 
the transition process, but the objective would be to qualify particular 
constituencies to appoint each NomCom delegate.

Other methods can be considered for selection of delegates from the At Large 
constituency or constituencies when the nascent At Large process matures to 
the point where there are viable and definable organizations that could 
carry out this function.

The ICANN Bylaws will need to ensure that, to the extent feasible, there is 
overall geographic and cultural diversity and balance across the Nominating 
Committee.

Terms

The initial NomCom delegates would be appointed for terms sufficient to 
allow for the selection of the new Board (and other relevant bodies as 
indicated in this document) as proposed. Once "steady-state" is achieved, 
NomCom members should serve non-renewable two-year terms that are staggered 
to ensure that half of the NomCom "turns over" each year. A NomCom member 
could, if selected, serve another two-year term provided there is at least a 
two-year hiatus in between. Members of the NomCom should be ineligible to 
serve as Directors of ICANN for at least one-year following their term of 
service on the NomCom.

4. Policy and Process

Policy Responsibility of the ICANN Board

The ICANN Board of Directors is ICANN's ultimate decision-making body. It 
and it alone has the legal responsibility to make and be legally accountable 
for all policy and other decisions. It is ultimately responsible for the 
management of the policy development process. Therefore, while it is highly 
desirable to seek and wherever possible find consensus, it does not follow 
that even proposals that enjoy consensus support should receive uncritical 
Board approval. The Board has a fiduciary responsibility to make decisions 
on the basis of good faith judgment in furthering the public interest.

Policy and Consensus Defined

"Policy" is a term that does not apply to every action that ICANN takes, 
through its Board or otherwise. To qualify as a policy decision, a matter 
brought before the Board for Board action should exhibit some or all of the 
following characteristics:

     * It should be broadly applicable to multiple situations or 
organizations (that is, not apply to just a single one-off situation);
     * It should be expected to have lasting value or applicability, albeit 
with occasional updates;
     * It should establish a guide or framework for future decision-making.

Many, if not most, decisions made by the Board do not fit within this 
meaning of a policy decision. They may, for example, be decisions regarding 
a single one-off situation that has no foreseeable future applicability, or 
they may be administrative decisions. To the extent possible, however, other 
decisions made by ICANN should be made within the framework of already 
developed policies. Certainly, specific decisions may stimulate the need to 
develop broad policies.

Policy development through bottom-up consensus processes should be 
encouraged. To be presumptively binding, any policy developed must reflect a 
true consensus, that is, a policy acceptable to the great majority of those 
affected, with no strong and reasoned opposition. Any such policy 
recommended to the ICANN Board, if not acceptable to the Board, should be 
returned to the policy development body with a clear statement of the 
Board's concerns. If and when such a recommendation is returned to the Board 
as a true consensus policy recommendation, the Board may reject or modify 
such a recommendation only by a 2/3 vote. In the absence of true consensus 
being achievable, the Board will act according to its own best judgment 
accounting for community principles, needs, and desires as best it can 
interpret them.

In contrast, any recommendations made by ICANN's policy development bodies 
on matters other than policy as defined above should have only whatever 
persuasive merit is inherent in the recommendation.


   [snip]

-- 
------
James Love, Consumer Project on Technology
http://www.cptech.org, mailto:love at cptech.org
voice: 1.202.387.8030; mobile 1.202.361.3040