[ncdnhc-discuss] ITU on ICANN
James Love
james.love at cptech.org
Sat Apr 13 14:46:23 CEST 2002
Thanks for GC for this. Jamie
Rev 1
Internal ITU Draft for Discussion
Do not copy, circulate, or distribute further.
Page 5 of 14
ICANN Reform
Editor: Richard Hill, ITU-T TSB, 8 March 2002
Management Summary
ICANN management has recently publicly stated that ICANN, as
currently constituted, is not able to fulfill its mission.
Greater government involvement and funding are required to make
ICANN effective. As a consequence, ICANN management has proposed
a reform of ICANN.
As part of that reform it appears appropriate to propose an
exploration of the ways, if any, in which ITU could cooperate with
ICANN to assist ICANN in performing its tasks, tasks which are
widely acknowledged to be critical for the good functioning of the
Internet.
Indeed, ITU-T has a proven track record of efficiently and
effectively performing, for non-Internet network technologies,
functions which are similar to ICANN's key functions, which are
"administrative and policy management of the Internet's naming and
address allocation systems", and of performing those functions in
accordance with the desired core values, which are "openness and
broad participation."
The ITU-T performs world-wide administration, and acts as the
forum for policy management, of a number of naming and address
allocation systems that are essential for the good functioning of
critical infrastructures, including the physical-layer
infrastructure of the Internet itself. We cite here only such
well-known examples as the E.164 numbering resource and the E.212
mobile numbering resource.
It is widely acknowledged that these tasks are performed to the
general satisfaction of industry, governments, and the public at
large. There is no reason to think that the ITU-T, in cooperation
with ICANN, would not be able to provide an equivalent level of
satisfaction for Internet-related naming and address allocation
systems.
It is clear that the marginal cost for ITU, in cooperation with
ICANN, to administer, and to act as the forum for policy
management, for additional naming and address allocation systems
is not great, at least not in terms of the direct costs for the
secretariat staff.
ITU-T has a long, well known, and well respected tradition for
open and participatory decision making. ITU-T processes are well
defined, well known, and stable. Governments are well used to the
ITU-T processes and procedures and know how to work within them.
All of the world's 189 governments can participate in the ITU-T's
work, as can any interested private company.
Furthermore, ITU-T is an effective public-private partnership,
rooted in the public sector but with the active backing and
participation of industry players.
It is hard to see why the existing ITU-T working methods would not
serve the Internet naming and address allocation systems as well
as they serve the existing naming and address allocation systems.
1. Introduction
Stuart Lynn, President of ICANN, has posted publicly a discussion
paper which states:
· ICANN as currently constituted is not able to fulfill its
mission
· governments are the best representatives of public interests
· much greater, and more formal, involvement by governments is
required if ICANN is to fulfill its mission
· ICANN's budget should be in the order of US $25 million per
year (comparable to the budget of ITU-T, which is $25 million per
year).
Mr Lynn states that a reformed ICANN would be a better alternative
for Internet governance than an intergovernmental organization
such as ITU. The reforms envisaged are, essentially, to have
government nomination of 1/3 of the ICANN board, and to obtain
government funding.
The purpose of this paper is to propose an exploration of the
ways, if any, in which ITU could cooperate with ICANN to help
ICANN achieve its goals.
2. How ITU-T Could Assist ICANN
In order to show how ITU-T could assist ICANN in fulfilling some
of the functions that, according to Mr Lynn, ICANN has proven
unable to fulfill, we first start with a summary of Mr Lynn's
descriptions of ICANN's shortcomings, and then show how the
existing ITU-T can help to overcome those shortcomings.
2.1 ICANN's shortcomings
According to Mr Lynn (all bullets below are direct quotations from
the cited paper by Mr Lynn):
1. ICANN was to serve as an alternative to the traditional, pre-
Internet model of a multinational governmental treaty
organization. The hope was that a private-sector body would be
like the Internet itself: more efficient - more nimble - more able
to react promptly to a rapidly changing environment and, at the
same time, more open to meaningful participation by more
stakeholders, developing policies through bottom-up consensus. It
was also expected that such an entity could be established, and
become functional, faster than a multinational governmental body.
2. . the hope was that ICANN could accomplish the necessary
coordination and management tasks more quickly and more
efficiently than the only apparent alternative - a multinational
governmental body of some kind.
3. But despite [some] progress, all the original expectations of
ICANN have not been realized. ICANN is still not fully organized,
and it is certainly not yet capable of shouldering the entire
responsibility of global DNS management and coordination. ICANN
has also not shown that it can be effective, nimble, and quick to
react to problems. ICANN is overburdened with process, and at the
same time underfunded and understaffed. For these and other more
fundamental reasons, ICANN in its current form has not become the
effective steward of the global Internet's naming and address
allocation systems as conceived by its founders. Perhaps even more
importantly, the passage of time has not increased the confidence
that it can meet its original expectations and hopes.
4. . a candid assessment of ICANN's performance to date would
have to conclude that it has fallen short of hopes and
expectations.
5. I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a
purely private sector body, based on consensus and consent, has
been shown to be impractical.
6. I have concluded that ICANN needs reform: deep, meaningful,
structural reform, based on a clearheaded understanding of the
successes and failures of the last three years. If ICANN is to
succeed, this reform must replace ICANN's unstable institutional
foundations with an effective public-private partnership, rooted
in the private sector but with the active backing and
participation of national governments.
7. The process of relocating functions from the US Government to
ICANN is stalled. For a variety of reasons described in this
document, I believe that ICANN's ability to make further progress
is blocked by its structural weaknesses. To put it bluntly: On its
present course, ICANN cannot accomplish its assigned mission.
8. . ICANN has gone about as far as it can go without
significant additional participation and backing from national
governments. Absent a substantial increase in the efforts of
governments to support and encourage the continued development of
the private sector approach, I do not believe that ICANN will be
able to complete the transition from US Government control to
global private sector management of the DNS and related functions
of the Internet.
9. I am now convinced that the original desire to avoid a
totally governmental takeover of the IANA functions led to an
overreaction - the choice of a totally private model. With three
years' experience, it is clear that model is simply not workable.
It is not workable because it leaves ICANN isolated from the real-
world institutions - governments - whose backing and support are
essential for any effective global coordinating body to accomplish
its assigned tasks.
10. Though many in the traditional Internet community react
strongly against the very mention of governments, it is simply
unrealistic to believe that global coordination of the DNS can
succeed without more active involvement of governments.
11. Governments play a unique role in representing the broad
public interests of their populations. So far, ICANN's existing
structures have not engaged the attention, commitment, and support
of governments to the necessary degree.
12. Funding . must be significantly increased, and sources of
funding broadened. Funding to come from both governmental and
private participants. Funding to include both contributions for
core functions and fees for services.
13. [ICANN] survives today on a heavily negotiated revenue stream
generated from a small number of very interested intermediaries -
who also have major influence in establishing the ICANN budget.
14. ICANN today cannot do everything it should do or in a timely
manner.
15. . the ICANN process as presently funded will never be able to
fulfill its intended coordination and consensus building tasks, .
16. A fully funded ICANN probably requires an operating budget of
300-500% of its current budget level, plus funding for significant
one-time expenditures if funding of root name server operators and
the establishment of appropriate reserves are included.
17. ICANN does not have the necessary resources even to continue
at the current level of operations.
18. The current role of the US Government is not consistent with
long-term global stability.
19. Today, [ICANN's] legitimate future prospects are, in my
judgment, non-existent, unless we engage in meaningful reform of
ICANN's structure and operations.
20. Either we need a renewed commitment to ICANN's original
mission, accompanied by a clear focus on the specific steps that
need to be taken to put ICANN in a position to accomplish that
mission, or we need to consider whether ICANN should seek to
withdraw in favor of a different global coordination approach.
21. ICANN will, in my opinion, either be reformed or irrelevant
within the next several months.
22. The required level of funding is in the order of US $ 25
million per year for the next three years.
23. Process that prevents effectiveness is a failure.
2.2 Resistance to the ITU-T's involvement
The main reasons advanced three years ago against ITU involvement
in Internet issues were:
1. An ITU process would be too slow.
2. An ITU process might violate the national interests of the
USA.
3. An ITU process might violate the commercial interests of
certain key players.
As Mr Lynn has conclusively argued, the situation today is;
4. ICANN has been far too slow. Any efforts to speed up ICANN
processes require a fundamental reorganization of ICANN. This
reform effort will itself take considerable time.
5. The ICANN process has, at a minimum, failed to protect the
national interests of several countries.
6. The ICANN process has been unduly influenced by certain
commercial interests, to the detriment of the commercial interests
of other players.
The situation today is very different from what it was three years
ago. Among other differences, we cite the very significant
reforms of ITU-T procedures, which permit ITU-T to operate much
faster than before.
We can also cite sensitivity to issues of national sovereignty,
including that of the USA, and it can be envisaged that any future
involvement of ITU-T would be fully consistent with the national
sovereignty of all Member States.
It should be noted that it is not proposed that ITU-T should take
over ICANN's functions. Furthermore, it is not proposed that the
ITU should become involved in all of ICANN's activities. In
particular, the operational management functions that are
currently part of ICANN's mission (in particular supervision of
root server and Registry operations) would not appear to be
suitable for ITU involvement. Similarly, dispute resolution
functions such as the approval and administration of the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) would not appear to
be suitable for ITU.
Finally, it is worth noting that ITU-T, as an intergovernmental
organization, enjoys sovereign immunity and thus does not require
liability insurance or extensive legal advice concerning liability
issues.
2.3 How ITU-T could assist ICANN
We start with some extracts from the cited paper detailing ICANN's
functions. The intended text that follows is directly copied from
the cited ICANN paper (except that the section numbers, such as
2.3.1, 2.3.1.1, have been added).
2.3.1 What ICANN Does (ICANN Staff Draft, 7 March 2002)
2.3.1.1 Overview
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is responsible for coordinating the Internet's
naming, address allocation, and protocol parameter
assignment systems. These systems enable globally unique
and universally interoperable identifiers for benefit of
the Internet and its users.
These systems are highly distributed: hundreds of
registries, registrars, and others, located around the
world, play essential roles in providing naming and
address allocation services for the Internet. ICANN's
paramount concern is the stability of these remarkably
robust services.
As overall coordinator of the Internet's systems of
unique identifiers, ICANN's role, while defined and
limited, includes both operational and policymaking
functions.
2.3.1.2 Operations
In the operational sphere, the ICANN staff perform a
range of day-to-day services, including:
(1) maintaining the DNS root zone file,
(2) allocating top-level blocks of IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses and AS numbers to the regional
Internet registries,
(3) maintaining 120+ registries of protocol
port and parameter numbers,
(4) publishing online databases of information
about the top-level domain registries included
in the DNS root zone file,
(5) operating one of the thirteen
authoritative DNS root name servers, and
coordinating the overall DNS root name server
system,
(6) publishing the InterNIC website and
related functions,
(7) operating the .int registry,
(8) maintaining common/technical IP address
spaces, such as the private-use address space,
(9) managing the reverse delegation namespace
at the top level, and
(10) administering the DNS implementations of
certain technical registries, such as .arpa
and the legacy infrastructure-related .int
zones.
In addition, ICANN staff perform a set of day-to-day
administrative and policy functions relating to the
generic top-level domain (gTLD) registries, including:
(1) accreditation of competitive registrars;
(2) supervising the administration of the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy;
(3) handling of complaints about
registrations;
(4) monitoring and enforcement of registry and
registrar agreements, and
(5) implementation of data escrow programs.
For the country-code top-level domain (ccTLD)
registries, ICANN staff handle, investigate, and process
requests for delegation and redelegation, and for
changes in the TLD nameservers specified in the root
zone file.
2.3.1.3 Security
Finally, ICANN has the responsibility for policy
coordination with respect to the security of the various
parts of infrastructure that make up the operational
DNS. This activity is reflected in the recent creation
of the Standing Committee on Security and Stability. In
addition, ICANN has certain operational security
responsibilities with respect to ICANN's operational
activities. Finally, ICANN attempts to nurture and
encourage continuing and serious attention to security
and stability issues by all participants in the DNS, and
to ensure that necessary tasks are undertaken by some
responsible party.
2.3.1.4 Policymaking
In the policymaking sphere, ICANN is responsible for
developing and implementing policies related to each of
its operational functions. The nature and scope of
ICANN's policymaking role differs for each function.
For example, in the area of IP address and AS number
allocation, ICANN's responsibility extends only to
global addressing policies; local policies are made by
each regional Internet registry or lower-level Internet
registries. ICANN's policy role for the country-code top-
level domain registries (ccTLDs) is similarly limited to
global policy coordination with deference to each local
Internet community's responsibility to set its own
registry-level policies (i.e., registration criteria,
pricing, dispute resolution, mechanisms for local
community participation and policymaking, etc.). In the
area of protocol numbering, ICANN administers the IANA
registries pursuant to the instructions of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF).
By contrast, ICANN plays a more direct and significant
role in setting registry-level policies for the global
top-level domain registries (gTLDs), such as .com, .net,
.org, .info, .name, and .biz. In effect, ICANN serves as
the global Internet community's open policymaking forum
for the gTLD registries.
In its initial charge from the U.S. Government, embodied
in the 1998 White Paper, ICANN policymaking was to be
guided by a set of non-technical principles: preserving
stability; promoting competition; relying where possible
on private-sector, bottom-up, participatory mechanisms
that reflect the functional and geographic diversity of
the Internet; development of efficient dispute
resolution alternatives (for the gTLD registries); and
promoting accountability in management (for all
registries).
These principles are necessarily somewhat general, which
has led to some confusion and disagreement about the
exact boundaries of ICANN's policymaking mission. This
has led some to suggest that those boundaries should be
restated and described in as much detail as is feasible,
taking into account the necessary flexibility required
to effectively deal with the rapidly changing nature of
the Internet. Such an effort, to the extent it produced
useful guidance both for ICANN and the Internet
community as a whole, would undoubtedly be a helpful
contribution to the current ICANN reform discussions.
A note on terminology: Historically, most of the
operational functions described above were performed
under the label of the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA). Though administered by a single team
at the Information Sciences Institute of the University
of Southern California, the IANA functions were
performed at the direction of two sources: the IETF and
the U.S. Government. Pursuant to an agreement with the
U.S. Government and a Memorandum of Understanding with
the IETF, ICANN is currently responsible for the full
set of IANA functions. Thus, one should keep in mind
that IANA refers to a set of functions, and that ICANN
is the organization designated separately by the U.S.
Government and the IETF to perform the IANA functions
for the benefit of the global Internet community.
2.3.2 Quotes from Mr Lynn
Next we reproduce some quotes from Mr Lynn:
1. [ICANN's core values are] openness and broad participation.
2. ICANN's assigned mission [is] to provide. administrative and
policy management of the Internet's naming and address allocation
systems.
3. ICANN's mission is effective management and coordination of
those few, higher-level elements of the Internet's naming and
address allocation systems that require or benefit from global
management and coordination, while abstaining from actions that
might interfere with the creativity and innovation that has made
the Internet such a dynamic resource.
4. Governments play a unique role in representing the broad
public interests of their populations.
5. Experience has shown that the influence, authority, and close
cooperation of governments is essential to accomplish ICANN's
mission.
6. What is needed at this stage if ICANN is to carry out its
mission is neither a totally private nor a totally governmental
solution, but rather a well-balanced public-private partnership.
7. The essential participants in an effective ICANN are, in no
particular order: (a) the various infrastructure providers of the
Internet, broadly defined; (b) major users; (c) the relevant
technical community and (d) national governments;
8. What may not be quite so obvious is my conclusion, based on
all our experience to date, that active national government
participation in ICANN is critical to its success. Indeed, in the
final analysis, national governments are perhaps the most
irreplaceable supporters of ICANN, in the sense that -
notwithstanding the efforts or desires of other stakeholders - the
backing of governments is necessary if private sector coordination
of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems is to be
feasible.
9. I am convinced an increased governmental role is essential if
ICANN is to carry out its mission.
10. National government participation, in my view, is also
essential to end the Sisyphean effort of searching for a workable
public accountability mechanism for ICANN.
11. Although governments vary around the world, for better or
worse they are the most evolved and best legitimated
representatives of their populations - that is, of the public
interest.
12. The fact is that the Internet, and therefore management and
coordination of the naming and addressing functions of the
Internet, are critically important to governments, because they
are critically important to their citizens and businesses.
13. [Some] believe that because ICANN is not itself a
governmental organization, it should build its own government-like
institutional foundations on a global scale. . Perhaps, but when
it comes right down to it, governments or bodies appointed with
government involvement can, it seems to me, certainly stake a
better claim to truly reflect the public interest than a few
thousands of self-selected voters scattered around the world.
2.3.3 Administration and policy management of naming and address
allocation systems
The ITU-T performs world-wide administration, and acts as the
forum for policy management, of a number of naming and address
allocation systems that are essential for the good functioning of
critical infrastructures, including the physical-layer
infrastructure of the Internet itself. We cite here only such
well-known examples as the E.164 numbering resource and the E.212
mobile numbering resource. ITU-T and its predecessors (such as
CCITT) have performed these functions for over 140 years.
It is widely acknowledged that these tasks are performed to the
general satisfaction of industry, governments, and the public at
large. There is no reason to think that a cooperation between the
ITU-T and ICANN would not be able to provide an equivalent level
of satisfaction for Internet-related naming and address allocation
systems.
It is clear that the marginal cost for ITU to cooperate with ICANN
to administer, and to act as the forum for policy management, for
additional naming and address allocation systems is not great, at
least not in terms of the direct costs for the secretariat staff.
Several forms of cooperation can be envisaged including, but not
limited to:
1. ITU-T to participate in the policy councils proposed by Mr.
Lynn
2. ITU-T to participate in the proposed Technical Advisory
Committee
3. ITU to participate more formally in the Government Advisory
Committee (for example, to represent countries that do not send
representatives to ICANN)
4. Certain administrative and/or policy management functions to
be provided in direct cooperation with ITU-T, using mechanisms to
be discussed
As the ICANN staff has stated:
[The principles governing ICANNs policymaking mission]
are necessarily somewhat general, which has led to some
confusion and disagreement about the exact boundaries of
ICANN's policymaking mission. This has led some to
suggest that those boundaries should be restated and
described in as much detail as is feasible, taking into
account the necessary flexibility required to
effectively deal with the rapidly changing nature of the
Internet. Such an effort, to the extent it produced
useful guidance both for ICANN and the Internet
community as a whole, would undoubtedly be a helpful
contribution to the current ICANN reform discussions.
Another area for cooperation could be for ITU-T to assist ICANN in
restating and describing, in appropriate detail, the boundaries
for ICANN's policymaking mission. Consideration could be given to
developing an ITU-T Recommendation with that goal.
2.3.4 Administration of ccTLDs
While there are many ITU Member States who either are or have
"ccTLD" managers under what they consider to be an appropriate
level of control, there are other Member States who are not
satisfied with their level of control of their "ccTLD" manager.
It appears that many of the smaller countries have had an ongoing
uphill struggle to get ICANN to sort out various issues which have
arisen in relation to the management of their ccTLD. It is
thought that the threat of law suits in a US jurisdiction may have
discouraged efforts to take some positive action.
A concerted effort within the ITU (involving the Secretary
General's staff, ITU-T and ITU-D) on this one issue alone might
prove to be useful.
As a starting point, ITU-T could cooperate with ICANN to develop a
set of procedures and practices that would be followed by all
ccTLD operators. ITU Member States could assist in this process
by encouraging their respective ccTLD operators to participate in
the work of defining the procedures and practices.
2.3.5 Administration of arpa
The fact that the "arpa" domain is perceived to be controlled by
US entities (whether ICANN through IANA or IAB through ISOC) has
created some very serious concerns regarding the implementation of
the ENUM protocol.
Such concerns could be mitigated if it were to be accepted
formally that ITU-T should play some role, to be discussed and
agreed, in the formal administration and control of the "arpa"
domain and its sub-domains, in particular "e164".
2.3.6 Administration of int
ICANN currently administers the "int" domain. Since that domain
name is reserved for intergovernmental treaty organizations, ITU-T
could assist ICANN by developing internationally agreed principles
and procedures for the administration of the "int" domain.
2.3.7 Core values
ITU-T has a long, well known, and well respected tradition for
open and participatory decision making. ITU-T processes are well
defined, well known, and stable. Governments are well used to the
ITU-T processes and procedures and know how to work within them.
All of the world's 189 governments can participate in the ITU-T's
work as can any interested private company. Participation is
facilitated by the translation and interpretation facilities
offered by ITU-T. The ITU's funding comes from all countries, but
also from private companies who are ITU members. This means that
funding has a very broad, international, and multi-sectorial base.
Certainly the ITU is ideally placed (with a membership of 189
countries and over 650 private companies) to obtain the views of a
wide cross section of member states
Indeed, ITU-T is an effective public-private partnership, rooted
in the public sector but with the active backing and participation
of industry players.
Thus, ITU-T is an excellent forum for discussing issues that are
of concern to both the general public and key industry players.
Consensus solutions developed within ITU-T tend to have support
from both industry and bodies whose role is to protect the public
interest.
It is hard to see why the existing ITU-T working methods, in
cooperation with ICANN, would not serve the Internet naming and
address allocation systems as well as they serve the existing
naming and address allocation systems.
3. Conclusions
ITU can assist ICANN by:
1. Asking its membership to comment on ICANN reform;
2. Participating as appropriate in policy councils, the
Technical Advisory Committee, and the Government Advisory
Committee, if such bodies are created in a reformed ICANN
3. Working with ICANN to identify areas where certain functions
could be performed in cooperation, for example:
3.1. ccTLD management
3.2. management of the "arpa" domain
3.3. management of the "int" domain
4. Working with ICANN to define an internationally agreed
restatement and description of the boundaries for ICANN's
policymaking mission. Consideration could be given to developing
an ITU-T Recommendation with that goal.
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