[NCUC-DISCUSS] NomCom Review ++

[Amr Elsadr]

Hi,

I don’t claim any special expertise on NomCom, so can only comment on it as someone who has observed the results of their work without being directly involved. There have been several concerns that I find to be worthy of consideration raised about the NomCom’s structure, and some of its work methods over the years. As Bill noted, I hope these will be seriously addressed during the upcoming Bylaws-mandated review. However, over the past few years, I have noticed some really fantastic appointments made by the NomCom, particularly on the GNSO Council and the ICANN Board (at least from a non-commercial perspective). Those may or may not have been special circumstances, but I believe it is worth taking note of those instances, figuring out what went right for non-commercial, and hopefully see more of it.

However, I do take issue with one thing Wolfgang mentioned within the context of a broader review of ICANN over the next 5-10 years:

> On Nov 26, 2016, at 11:40 AM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang <wolfgang.kleinwaechter at MEDIENKOMM.UNI-HALLE.DE> wrote:
> 
> 

[SNIP]

> In Marrakesh (March 2016) we had an informal BOF session where we agreed that 
> a. we have to think about it in a more holistic asnd strategic way and 
> b. that first things have to come first, that is i. finish workstream 1 and complete the IANA transition and introduce the new accountability mechanism (which is done), ii. continue to work on WS 2 with the aim to finish this in 2017/2018 (as sooner as better) and iii. start before 2020 (probably on the basis of the ATRT III report) a cross constituency working group with the mandate to propose an adjusted structure - a "Grand Re-Design" - based on the great achievements we have with the reformed accountability mechanisms and the empowered community, to make ICANN fit fo the 2020s. 
> 
> One proposal (as a first idea) would be to have a layered structure (four layers) based on constituency and stakeholder networks (four stakeholders):
> a. Representative Board as a "coordination and communication body"
> b. Contracted parties as SOs with specific manadte in their field of competence/contracts
> c. Stakeholder groups as ACs with a specific mandate to bring the perspective of their constituencioes both to the SOs and the Board in PD and decision making. 
> d. CCWGs as PDP bodies.
> 
> But again this is just one idea for the kick start of a longer journey into the next "unknown territory". 

…, specifically, “d. CCWGs as PDP bodies”. I’m not sure I understood this correctly, but my impression upon reading is that it is being suggested that CCWGs be used to develop policy recommendations (presumably, making those recommendations to the ICANN Board).

Personally, I’m not at all in favor of this. I strongly believe that gTLD policy development should take place nowhere outside of the GNSO. The purpose of the GNSO is very different from the purpose of something like ALAC (for example). First of all, the primary mandate of the GNSO is gTLD policy development. We have no other purpose, from a policy development perspective. On the other hand, the purpose of Advisory Committees is broader, and that is to give the ICANN Board Advice on various issues ranging from gTLDs to IP Addresses and more.

More importantly, Milton has recently explained the reason for the primary structural division of the GNSO in to contracted and non-contracted halves. Although gTLD registries and registrars (contracted parties) are the stakeholders primarily affected by gTLD policies developed at ICANN through changes in their contractual obligations with ICANN, as a result of the policies developed, non-contracted parties are still far more directly impacted by these policies than other stakeholders (such as Internet users) are. I am specifically referring to us in the non-contracted half of the GNSO consisting of both commercial and noncommercial domain name registrants. Although we are not parties to the contracts between ICANN and registries/registrars, the effect of those contracts trickle down to us in our agreements with registrars, either positively or negatively. This is also now expanding to privacy/proxy service providers, who ICANN is going to start accrediting in the same manner it does registrars.

Having “CCWGs as PDP bodies” will have repercussions that I find to be negative including:

1. It will remove those of us who are most affected by gTLD policy development from our current role as stewards of the PDP, and instead have us share this role with ACs, such as the GAC, who are purposefully meant to have a very limited say on those policies.

2. It is important to note that GNSO working groups that develop gTLD policies are actually far more developed in the process and procedures that govern them, and (more importantly) far more open to full membership than cross-community working groups are. Not too long ago, I was a member of a PDP working group that had members from within the GNSO, SSAC, GAC and even some who had no affiliation to any ICANN SO or AC. All of us participated in this working group on equal footing, with an equal say in the consensus of the working group and equal rights to redress mechanisms, should a member of the working group have any grievances. The same cannot be said for CCWGs, that only have a handful of members who are officially appointed by ICANNs SOs and ACs. Others cannot be full members, but participants, and although participants have equal participation rights in CCWGs, it is not necessary to include them in a CCWGs consensus-call.

3. If CCWGs become PDP bodies, I’m not sure the GNSO will have any real unique relevance. I’m actually not sure what our role would be at all. Would our relevance be limited to our place on the new Empowered Community, selection of Board members and appointments to the NomCom? A suggestion of moving PDPs outside of the GNSO could very well go hand-in-hand with a suggestion to dissolve the GNSO entirely.

On careful reading, I also note “b.” above to say “Contracted parties as SOs with specific mandate in their field of competence/contracts”. My understanding of the suggestion here is to limit membership in the GNSO to contracted parties, and do away with the NCSG and CSG. As a domain name registrant, I would very much like to remain a part of the GNSO, and maintain a direct say in how policies that affect the terms and conditions of my registrations are developed.

Anyway…, I don’t mean to distract from the original topic of the NomCom review, but felt compelled to comment on this. I hope my comments were at least a little helpful.

Thanks.

Amr