[NCSG-Discuss] ICANN Representative Structures

[Andrew A. Adams]

(I've changed the subject line because I'm moving the discussion with Evan 
into separate threads.)

On 24 March 2013 20:17, Andrew A. Adams <aaa at meiji.ac.jp> wrote:
>> If you and others truly feel that the NCSG/NCUC charter which allows
>> non-registrants with non-commercial interests in the name space to
>> ahve a voice in ICANN is insufficient (*) then I think you should
>> make an argument for the creation of a new SG or constituency

Evan Liebovitch replied:
> No need to re-invent that particular wheel.
> See ICANN Bylaw XI.2.4.
> Pay special attention to the first sentence of XI.2.4.a, as well as 
> XI.2.4.j.7 and XI.2.4.j.10.

But Evan, you started this by saying that lots of users were diseinfranchised 
within the GNSO structure and that therefore dictatorial action by the staff 
was justified because the GNSO-based MSM was at base too narrow and therefore 
illegitimate. Now, I haven't looked hard enough at ICANN detailed structures, 
so please correct me if I'm wrong, but the model is supposed to work like 
this:

GNSO develops policy recommendations through a MSM

ACs comment on these policy recommendations

Board adopts policy from GNSO (possibly with minor amendments due to AC 
comments) or send it back to GNSO with requests to amend based on their own 
input and AC advice.

Staff implements Board adopted policies.


Instead what we have is staff proposing policy, which is sometimes in 
agreement with some or all AC's advice. Your statement is that because ALAC 
agrees substantially with the current staff policy proposals (*) that ALAC is 
fine with this since the GNSO MSM is too narrow and needs someone to act 
dictatorially to represent the silent majority.

I suggested that you try to fix the too-narrow MSM of the GNSO and you 
pointed me to the remit of the ACs and ALAC in particular. That's not the 
problem here. You are claiming that GNSO is unrepresentative and so staff 
should be permitted to make policy. I see no reason to believe that this 
would actually give those you claim are currently diseinfranchised from the 
GNSO any more influence. Staff policy proposals this time may fit with their 
needs expressed through ALAC but staff change, staf are subject to highly 
capricious and capturable changes of direction and there is significant lack 
of transparency and accountability with staff-driven policy-making processes.




(*) I'm splitting off the question of ALAC's support for this proposal from 
the structural question. See other message.

-- 
Professor Andrew A Adams                      aaa at meiji.ac.jp
Professor at Graduate School of Business Administration,  and
Deputy Director of the Centre for Business Information Ethics
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan       http://www.a-cubed.info/