beyond take down
Marc Perkel
marc at CHURCHOFREALITY.ORG
Sun Nov 20 18:58:49 CET 2011
Whether it be BIND or any other DNS software the short answer is - yes.
Any DNS software can be programmed to return any result under any sort
of conditions. It's just software that accepts a query and returns a
response. The response can be anything. Currently it is programmed to
obey bind rules - but it doesn't have to. You can put in any kind of
rules you want to get any result or no response you want.
Technically there is nothing that can't be done. It's all about policy
and agreement. DNS can do anything.
On 11/20/2011 9:10 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>
> Does anyone on this list know more about the way BIND is being amended
> to allow the "rewriting" of DNS answers? Jorge? Timothe?
>
> *From:*NCSG-Discuss [mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU] *On Behalf
> Of *William Drake
> *Sent:* Sunday, November 20, 2011 10:22 AM
> *To:* NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU
> *Subject:* [NCSG-Discuss] beyond take down
>
>
> Hi
>
>
> As discussed on our call the other night, some of the key
> developments from a global public interest standpoint go beyond
> GNSO & ICANN policies but we might still consider whether there's
> grounds for useful NC engagement...
>
> & BTW Monika quotes Wendy in the below...
>
>
>
> http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/11/20/filtering-and-blocking-closer-to-the-core-of-the-internet/print/
>
> Filtering and Blocking Closer To The Core Of The Internet?
> By Monika Ermert for Intellectual Property Watch on 20/11/2011 @
> 1:00 pm
>
>
>
> With protests against draft US legislation like the Stop Online
> Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act ongoing and the European
> Parliament voting on 17 November for a resolution to request that
> the United States should be "refraining from unilateral measures
> to revoke IP addresses or domain names," politicians are talking a
> lot about technology for the internet domain name system. But at
> the same time, engineers are getting more political and are
> intensively discussing technology providing the tools for blocking
> -- by governments and private parties.
>
> For the community that cares for the functioning of the domain
> name system (DNS), it came as a shock when Paul Vixie, founder of
> the Internet Software Consortium (ISC), said that the BIND
> software would allow the filtering out of sites with a bad
> "reputation" -- like listed malware sites -- and also the
> "rewriting" of DNS answers -- manipulating what people get to see
> when asking for domain names.
>
> Vixie is a guru of the DNS and one of the authors of the letter by
> well-known experts against DNS blocking in the Protect IP Act. But
> he is perhaps best-known for being the father of BIND, which has
> for a decade been the open source tool that makes the DNS work.
>
> More Filter-Friendly DNS Software
>
> Jim Reid, one of the chairs of the DNS working group at the
> Réseaux IP Europeéns, said during a recent debate about principles
> that he was "rather saddened" by ISC's decision to allow the
> rewriting. "We're giving the bad guys tools," Reid warned.
>
> The rewriting -- which sends back a "lie" upon a request to the
> DNS from someone looking for a website -- "also sends a rather
> nasty message saying it's okay to do this kind of thing." What is
> worse from the engineers' standpoint with the rewriting is that it
> breaks new measures to secure the DNS, because the "lies" are
> detected and dropped without users knowing what happened.
>
> The "lying" is currently happening for domains seized by the US
> government agency ICE (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement),
> some of them legal in their country of origin, like the Spanish
> RojaDirecta.com <http://RojaDirecta.com>, (a case discussed
> intensively by the experts). When typing RojaDirecta.com
> <http://RojaDirecta.com>, users do not get to that site, but to
> a warning/blocking site by the ICE.
>
> It is this kind of case that has stirred up debate in the European
> Parliament, pushed by the European Digital Right initiative
> (EDRi). "By this you render a site and the data inaccessible
> without having any court order in the site owner's country," said
> Joe McNamee, who fought for the declaration now officially
> included in the Parliament's resolution on the upcoming European
> Union-US Summit of 28 November 2011.
>
> The text of the Parliament resolution is here [1].
>
> Under the topic "Freedom and Security," the declaration stresses
> the need "to protect the integrity of the global internet and
> freedom of communication by refraining from unilateral measures to
> revoke IP addresses or domain names."
>
> SOPA, McNamee warned, would be so broad that "it could be
> interpreted in a way that would mean that no online resource in
> the global internet would be outside US jurisdiction."
>
> Of those who provide users with domain names -- with the so-called
> DNS registrars closer to the user and the user's jurisdictions --
> it is the registry companies who manage the central database for
> zones like .com (for example) who are an easy target when it comes
> to take-downs. They keep the record of who every .com domain name
> is delegated to and inform those looking for a site where to go.
> So they can from a top spot in the DNS hierarchy point to a
> "wrong" location.
>
> What makes things difficult is that many large registries, like
> VeriSign (registry for .com and .net) which changed the
> rojadirecta.com <http://rojadirecta.com> record, are located in
> the United States and while offering services globally in name,
> they in fact are bound by US law.
>
> Registries -- Target for Take-Downs
>
> VeriSign recently tried to get a new registry policy acknowledged
> by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
> (ICANN), the DNS technical oversight body, which would have
> allowed the dot com and .dot net registry (VeriSign) "to comply
> with any applicable court orders, laws, government rules or
> requirements, requests of law enforcement or other governmental or
> quasi-governmental agency, or any dispute resolution process."
> After a first wave of protests, the company backed off and
> withdrew the test for the time being.
>
> Matt Pounsett from Afilias, the registry for .info and some other
> TLDs, explained the dilemma. While the registries certainly like
> people to see the correct DNS-answers that they send, "there are
> cases where even we participate in things like that, particularly
> domain take-down." Many take-downs were made when it was found out
> "that a particular domain is being used in a way that violates
> acceptable use."
>
> Registry operators and a software providers like ISC underline
> that the fight against malware mainly drives their interventions.
> BIND's filtering function will help the manager of a local domain
> to protect his network. Customers are pushing, for example, for
> options like rewriting, said Joao Damas, a developer at ISC.
>
> The rewriting not only allows ICE to lead people to their website
> instead of Rojadirecta's, it also allows commercial companies to
> attract traffic to their search engine with recommendations and
> paid ads. Some big telecommunications providers, for example, lure
> users to their search site every time they mistype a domain name
> or simply look for something that does not exist.
>
> "If we do not do offer functionalities like the rewriting in our
> BIND software, we will drive them away from BIND," said Damas.
> BIND's new "reputation policy zone" function allows people to have
> names checked against lists of alleged bad actors, known spammers
> or malware-distributers, and in case of a match do not display the
> respective sites.
>
> More Private Filtering
>
> But what about the governance of increased private manipulation
> and also filtering that is enabled by better tools, asked Peter
> Koch, a DNS expert at Denic, the registry for the .de. country
> code TLD of Germany. "When we talk about a near real-time facility
> that would enable certain groups to influence resolvers to block
> or rewrite resolution data," Koch warned, collateral damage and
> even liability issues could arise. The more sceptical engineers
> also warn that such interventions could make the deployment of
> secure DNS on the last mile to the user very difficult. As they,
> including Vixie, have worked for a decade to implement this kind
> of security, they oppose it from an architectural standpoint.
>
> Civil liberty advocates like McNamee or Wendy Seltzer, co-founder
> of the project Chilling Effects, point to the difficulties for
> victims of the varieties of filtering possibilities to push back.
> Why can a DMCA (US Digital Millennium Copyright Act [2]) request
> from a private party lead to Google even filtering a part of the
> rojadirecta website included in the Spanish version and housed
> under .es, the country code TLD of Spain -- as actually happened?
>
> "Today the biggest problem is there's too many things happening
> not based on legislation," said Patrik Fältström, chair of the
> Security and Stability Advisory Committee of the ICANN. Fältström
> belongs to the engineers hoping that fixing the political code
> might be the first necessary step to solve the problems. Only then
> would the next step be addressed, Fältström said, in addressing
> conflicting national legislations. A mega-size example is coming
> with regard to this problem: the introduction of new TLDs as
> approved by ICANN.
>
> Could ICANN approve a domain name that is illegal in one
> jurisdiction? asked Fältström. Several jurisdictions
> have announced they would otherwise block complete TLDs, with new
> top level domains like .gay being only one example not being
> welcome everywhere in the world. Or should controversial new
> address zones be blocked at the outset by ICANN?
>
> If the registries are close to the core, the root zone that lists
> existing TLDs (like .com, .net, .ch) and future ones could be seen
> as one core spot of the global internet.
>
> With the new contract for the managing of this root function, the
> Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) contract, the US
> administration seems to have put itself in a difficult spot. The
> contract has been performed by the ICANN so far, and the US
> National Telecommunications and Information Administration
> oversees the work. The difficult spot for NTIA is that they will
> for every new TLD check if ICANN's procedure for approving a new
> TLD has been supportive of the "global public interest". What will
> the US do about potential knocks at their door from those who
> do not like to have a .gay or a .sex? It will be a difficult
> filtering function, close to the core.
>
> Related Articles:
>
>
> . IP Enforcement Permeates ICANN, US Internet Policy [3]
>
>
> . US Gets Threatening Over ICANN's New Internet Domain Plan [4]
>
>
> . ICANN Board Approval Opens Internet To Many New Domains [5]
>
>
> Categories: Access to Knowledge,Enforcement,English,Features,Human
> Rights,Information and Communications Technology/ Broadcasting,IP
> Policies,Language,Themes,Trademarks/Geographical
> Indications/Domains,United Nations,US Policy,Venues
> Article printed from Intellectual Property Watch:
> http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog
>
> URL to article:
> http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/11/20/filtering-and-blocking-closer-to-the-core-of-the-internet/
>
> URLs in this post:
>
> [1] resolution is here:
> http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0510&language=EN&ring=P7-RC-2011-0577
> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0510&language=EN&ring=P7-RC-2011-0577>
> [2] Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Millennium_Copyright_Act
> [3] IP Enforcement Permeates ICANN, US Internet Policy:
> http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/03/13/ip-enforcement-permeates-icann-us-internet-policy/
> [4] US Gets Threatening Over ICANN's New Internet Domain Plan:
> http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/05/06/us-gets-threatening-over-icann%e2%80%99s-new-internet-domain-plan/
> [5] ICANN Board Approval Opens Internet To Many New Domains:
> http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/06/20/icann-board-approves-long-awaited-plan-for-new-internet-domains/
>
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