proposed NCUC response to the ICANN-VeriSign settlement

[Milton Mueller]

Have fun with this one, folks. This should generate discussion. If it
does not, you are all dead. ;-)


DRAFT NCUC response to the ICANN-VeriSign settlement
- for discussion only 11/10/05

Impact on noncommercial users
The specific changes proposed for the .com contract will not have a
major impact on noncommercial users because most of us do not register
in .com. However, the method by which this decision was reached may have
lasting and major effects on the way ICANN operates. The effects
potentially go far beyond .com. Specifically, we see private bargaining
between ICANN staff and its contractors replacing the policy development
process of ICANN's constituencies. While we do not believe that every
change in registry contracts should be subject to collective oversight,
in this case we believe that ICANN staff has crossed the boundary
between contracting and policy making.

Therefore we propose the following actionable items to the Board:

1. We would like to see the "no criticism of ICANN" provisions
stricken from the settlement agreement.
We are concerned about a pact between a large, dominant business and
the policy setting authority in which one of the parties agrees not to
criticize the other. We find this threatening to the free and robust
dialogue about policy that should take place within ICANN.

2. We would like to see ICANN's GNSO initiate a policy development
process of the issue of registry renewal expectancy, and produce and
adopt a uniform policy that would apply equally to all registries
Some within the NCUC accept the idea of stable property rights in a TLD
registry, in which registries have renewal expectancy unless they engage
in serious service breakdowns or malfeasance. Others support regular
rebids of the right to operate the domain. A similar difference of
opinion probably exists in other constituencies. This issue should not
be resolved by the ICANN staff in secret bargaining sessions. Nor should
it be resolved on a piecemeal basis. Moreover, all registries should be
treated equally in this regard. Therefore a policy should be set via the
ICANN process, and used as the basis for staff negotiations with
registries.

3. We would like to see a policy development process on the issue of
price caps for registries.
Here again, arguments can be made for and against the elimination or
relaxation of contractual price caps. The best policy probably would
apply to all registries, or might depend on the market power of the
relevant registry. This issue should not be resolved by the ICANN staff
in secret bargaining sessions. Nor should it be resolved on a piecemeal
basis. Moreover, all registries should be treated equally in this
regard. Therefore a policy should be set via the ICANN process, and used
as the basis for staff negotiations with registries.

4. As a general principle, we support the transfer of DNS root zone
signing authority from VeriSign to ICANN, but believe that ICANN's
legitimacy, independence and representational structures need
improvement, and hope that ICANN and the US government will respond to
appropriate reforms coming out of the WSIS process.