[ncdnhc-discuss] IPC positionon WLS proposal

[James Love]

If anyone in the NCC has strong views on the transfers issues, let me know.
I want to start taking positions soon on these proposals.   I am assuming an
opposition to WLS is ok with people.  And other are other issues.   Jamie

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IPC Position on the VeriSign WLS Proposal

Background

On 30 December 2001 VeriSign GRS sent a proposal to the
DNSO Registrars Constituency proposing a Wait Listing
Service. This will be debated at the ICANN Public Forum
in Romania on 27 June 2002 and in the Names Council prior
to that. The purpose of this paper is therefore to
highlight key issues in summarised format that have been
raised so far in TTF discussions in phone conferences and
e-mail and to suggest some possible conclusions.

We have tried to concentrate in our conclusions on
matters of relevance to IP owners.

Matters already raised by the IPC include:
  ·    The need for accurate whois information when names
     are allocated through the WLS to subscribers
·    The need for safeguards that names disputed under
the UDRP will go to the complainant, as appropriate, and
not the WLS subscriber
·    The need for the identity of WLS subscribers to be
kept secret so that bad-faith/current registrants do not
keep renewing names whilst offering them for sale to the
identified WLS subscriber

A)  Against the VeriSign WLS

Key issue

ICANN does not have a policy governing when registrars
must delete a domain name from the SRS. This leads to
consumer dissatisfaction, uncertainty and bad practice -
such as the "hoarding" of domain names.

Other issues

VeriSign WLS is a registry level solution that reinforces
their sole-source situation.
There are other solutions. One interesting idea that
avoids the sole source problem is set out in Appendix One

The VeriSign WLS proposal would favour registrars with a
large pool of undeleted names. In the short-term, it
might provoke an increase in hoarding.

SnapNames has shown there is a demand for services of
this kind but there is no evidence of any desire for a
registry level service from domain name owners. Opinion
is split on whether SnapNames type services are tools for
speculators or IP owners. Certainly some IP owners
subscribe to SnapNames but there is no hard market
information available on support for IP owners for the
WLS. Most IP owners who have joined the debate appear -
anecdotally - to be against the WLS.

The proposed grand fathering of SnapNames clients under
the WLS is unfair to operators of other systems

The proposed one year trial could in effect take two
years to complete given the annual run of renewals. By
the time it is completed, competing services will have
ceased operation

The very existence of a WLS will push the price of domain
name ownership/management up. This is especially true for
IP owners with large portfolios of names.  An interesting
option would be to allow owners to opt out of the WLS,
forbidding the placement of WLS on their names.

The proposed pricing of a WLS, although reduced after
representations by the IPC amongst others, is still high
at $35. A sole-source, registry based operation will kill
off natural market competition (though registrars could
set their own prices)

A sole-source WLS solution will require considerable
oversight. ICANN is not currently resourced to undertake
such duties effectively. It is not clear if this will be
the case going forward.



B) In support of the VeriSign WLS

In the absence of a uniform deletion policy, especially a
redemption grace period, the VeriSign WLS is an approach
that would offer IP owners (and the consumers they serve)
a formal way of obtaining a desired name

A sole source provider at the registry level allows
registrars to add value and so to compete

SnapNames technology is proven. It is the market leader
and is used by some IP owners

There is a technical problem for registries with "add
storms" when load demand is hard to balance (but is this
in itself sufficient justification for a WLS?)

Conclusions

The VeriSign WLS proposal does not have the support of
the IPC as it stands because:
  ·    It does not enhance competition
·    It will increase the cost of domain name management
·    Concerns from the internet community raised so far
have not been answered (from the grandfathering of
SnapNames or the availability of subscriber information
to the ability of ICANN to oversee the process)
Because the proposed trial would in effect kill off any
competition and lock all gTLD owners into a single-source
system for perhaps two years, it should not be adopted
alone.

However, IP owners and the consumers they serve are
inconvenienced and unhappy with the current bulk deletion
process which is uncertain. Should ICANN introduce the
mandatory Redemption Grace Period proposal that has been
widely discussed, the interests of IP owners (and most
consumers) would be safeguarded to a large part. In such
circumstances, with IP owners offered a degree of
certainty and protection, an improved version of the
VeriSign WLS, could be supported by the IPC, though it
should be noted that here is no evidence of any desire
amongst IP owners for the service.

Finally, at a time when ICANN is restructuring itself,
the IPC urges it to proceed with caution when addressing
the fundamental issue of the rewriting of registry
contracts.

Last Thoughts

What will the WLS mean for IP owners in practical terms?

If the WLS is introduced in conjunction with/after the
introduction of a Redemption Grace Period, efficient IP
owners will be in control of their names if their records
are up to date and need not fear losing them. Therefore
the WLS will not be of any importance as far as managing
existing portfolios is concerned

If a WLS subscription is taken out on a name owned by an
IP owner, the IP owner will want to know who has
undertaken the subscription. This argues for a searchable
database of WLS subscribers

If an IP owner chooses to use the WLS to secure a name,
the IP owner will probably wish to remain anonymous and
will choose to work through a third party such as a
private investigator (as already happens with many
friendly previously-owned domain name purchases). This is
a method of controlling price

If a domain name owner who has speculated on
registrations knows that a WLS subscription has been
placed on a name, the speculator will probably keep
paying for the name but put a "For Sale" note up on a web
site the name points to

Ends


Appendix One

An Alternative to the VeriSign WLS

Submitted be e-mail by Richard Henderson of NTL, 25 May
2002

Richard writes:

Starting point : It is unacceptable that ordinary
internet users and members of the public are
disadvantaged when domain names expire and are
redistributed.

The underlying principle of ICANN is that domain names
should be "distributed fairly without advantage to any
party".

However, when expired domain names become available, they
are often snapped up by registrars, or scripts designed
to detect their availability in seconds. This prevents
the fair distribution to ordinary people.

Therefore a process is required. I propose:

60 days after expiry date, names are automatically placed
in a central pool of expired domain names.

Every 60 days, the names that have been in that pool for
at least 30 days will be published and offered in a
Public Landrush.

This Landrush will be administered along the lines of the
.info and .biz landrushes, through competing registrars
(thereby providing some much-needed revenue to the
failing domain name industry).

However, the rules will be tightly regulated:

1. There will be no advantage gained by submitting
"exclusive" queues because in the selection process, ALL
applications for a given name will be randomised, and ONE
name chosen. This will NOT be done on a "round-robin"
process going from registrar to registrar.

2. All participating registrars will be required to use
identical "Common User Interfaces" accessible online so
that EVERY member of the public can have access to EVERY
interface. Registrars who do not wish to open their sites
to everyone using this common user interface need not
participate. They can just carry on their normal business
with their chosen clients but not take part in the Public
Landrushes for Re-Distributed Names. The Re-Distribution
of Domain Names must be organised for maximum benefit for
consumers, NOT for the sake of registrars. (There will,
however, be benefit for participating registrars.)

3. The registration price for a domain will be the same,
whichever registrar you apply through. However, once you
obtain a domain using this method, registrars may
subsequently offer you additional services at their own
prices, in order to facilitate competition and variation
of product.

4. There will be a small token price for each application
(say $5) to prevent frivolous applications and to secure
credit card details for successful applicants. However,
there will be no card "authorisation" and you will only
be charged when you are successfully selected. In the
event of a failed credit card, the applicant will have 7
days to re-submit credit card details, after which the
name will be offered to the randomly-selected number 2,
3, 4 etc on the list. If no applicant obtains a domain,
it will return to the Pool and be re-issued in the next
Landrush. After a second issue in a Landrush, if it has
not been taken, it will simply be placed for sale live.

A Second model would bypass Registrars altogether and
simply offer a Landrush through a centralised provider.
On successful selection, the applicant would then select
from a list of Registrars and purchase the name through
them. This would favour competition because people would
tend to choose cheap Registrars unless they wanted
special services, in which case they could exercise
choice.

I suspect the Second model might involve greater
difficulties with the problem of an applicant using
multiple identities and multiple e-mail addresses - but,
to be honest, that problem will always exist, and my
analysis of the .info and .biz whois databases suggests
that in practice, a large variety of applicants obtain
names... much larger than the small exclusive groups who
presently "snatch" expired names on their release. In
some cases, they are never really released at all.

While I'm not saying that these models do not need
discussion and fine-tuning, I suggest to you that the
interests of ordinary members of the public - and the
obligation for a fair and open distribution of names -
are better served this way than by the "inside" hijacking
of expiring domain names which takes place at present.

There will be those who argue that because my systems
reject "round-robin" they will disadvantage small
registrars. My counter-argument is (a) my system puts the
needs of the public first (b) I think the public may very
well NOT choose NetSol just because they are big...
indeed Landrush applications are showing a growing
discrimination against big registrars (c) if this is
still asserted as a problem, then part of the application
fees could be used to "subsidise" those who are supposed
to lose out (though I would not like this very much).

There will also be bleatings from the Intellectual
Property industry of course. But I would not involve any
Sunrise or IP claims process at all in these Landrushes.
There are already due processes in place for the
protection of Intellectual Property, and as these are re-
distributed names, companies would already have had time
to challenge the names previously, and would continue to
be able to do so in the future.

I invite comments from interested parties, and from
ICANN, on this way of re-distributing expired domain
names.

Richard Henderson



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James Love mailto:james.love at cptech.org
http://www.cptech.org +1.202.387.8030 mobile +1.202.361.3040