[ncdnhc-discuss] ccSO

[Chun Eung Hwi]

Dear Kent Crispin, 

On Fri, 21 Dec 2001, Kent Crispin wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2001 at 08:44:13PM -0600, Alejandro Pisanty wrote:
> > > > I agree.  I think that the idea of a ccSO is very poorly considered, and
> > > > raises all kinds of questions that were very difficult to answer during
> > > > the DNSO formation process.  For example, would the ccSO have a
> > > > constituency structure? Would there be a NCC in the ccSO? How would
> > > > other interests participate? Would there be an IDNHC for the ccSO?
> > >
> > > Kent, I have some questions.
> > > Do ASO and PSO have constituency structure?
> > 
> > This may not be too relevant for the discussion.
> 
> Yes.  The ASO and PSO deal with quite different kinds of issues.  There
> is very little end-user involvement in address allocation, and address 
> allocation technical concerns are much more obscure than DNS (and of course, 
> DNS is pretty obscure to begin with).  The concerns of the PSO has even 
> less in common with the DNSO.

It is unnecessary for you to explain this basic knowledge that everybody
know. My point is that all SOs don't have to have constituency
structure. And I have already explained that each cc's have their own
governance structure composed of a diversity of interest groups. 


> On the other hand, there is an enormous amount of overlap between the
> concerns of ccTLD users and gTLD users -- in fact the differences within
> the classes are as great as the differences between the classes.  (The
> differences between .com and .edu users may be greater than the
> differences between .com and .co.uk users.)

Much more things than what you emphasize the overlapping part between
ccTLDs and gTLDs, I can point out the differences between two groups.
Basic differences between you and I rely on the fact that you are saying
about the common elements between two while I emphasize the differences.


> The representational issues so far discussed only scratch the surface; 
> collectively, I find the problems overwhelming.  They are interrelated,
> so it is hard to disentangle them into neat bullets.  But here are some
> not-so-neat bullets:
> 
>   1) What happens to the DNSO? If a ccSO is formed, you can't just get rid
>   of the DNSO, because then there would be no forum for gTLD issues. 
>   Chun noted that a gTLD SO would be a bad idea; however, if a ccSO is
>   formed, then the current DNSO would in fact become the gTLD SO (gSO). 

Please wait! In saying that gTLD SO is a bad idea, what I meant was that
gTLD SO would be composed of only gTLD registries (or including
registrars). But if the current DNSO would become the gTLD SO after ccSO
is to be formed, it is not bad and acceptable.


>   While the structural changes to the DNSO in the conversion from DNSO
>   to a (gSO,ccSO) pair might be minor, that isn't the real issue: the
>   gSO and the ccSO would have a peculiar relationship, because there
>   would be so much overlap in policy issues between them.
> 
>   The effects of this on board dynamics could obviously be profound; one
>   of the effects certainly would be to move decision making higher up
>   the tree -- decisions about DNS policy would in effect be moved to
>   negotiations between the upper echelons of the gSO and the ccSO, if
>   not to the board itself.  As Milton points out, in the long run the
>   most likely effect is to move yet more decision making to the staff

I partly agree with your and Milton's observation that DNSO and ccSO would
negotiate about many DNS policies. And I think that it could not be bad
because I think that ccSO would also consider public interests as well as
private commercial interests in relation to those DNS policies. I think
that it could make some more balanced procedure for making DNS related
policies. And I don't fear the possibility that the Board would finally
decide on the deadlocked issues and more depend on staff's decision
because the half of at large directors would ensure to make a balanced DNS
policies - this is the basic assumption of this debate. 


>   2) The ccTLD constituency is a constituency of ccTLD registries; it is
>   not a constituency of ccTLD users.  It is the ccTLD registries that
>   are calling for a ccSO, not ccTLD users.  Without exception, in every
>   discussion of this issue that I have witnessed (I have witnessed
>   many), the concrete concerns that are expressed as motives for the
>   creation of a ccSO are the direct concerns of registries, not users, eg:
>   the contracts between ICANN and cc's; how the cc registries should
>   contribute to the support of ICANN, modifications to contact data, and
>   so on.  [Of course there are *indirect* effects on ccTLD registry
>   customers, just as there are indirect effects on the customers of gTLD
>   registries.]

Here, I find the fundamentally differet idea on ccTLD community from you.  
The contract of cc's with ICANN - funding issue is also subordinate to
this contract issue - is not simply the issue of ccTLD registries but also
that of all ccTLD users. Although you are saying that there are indirect
effects on ccTLD users, its effect is very decisively important to all
ccTLD users. Maybe, your poor experience of using your .us ccTLD because
of your affluent resources of special gTLDs like .gov, .mil, .edu may make
your poor perception of the importance of ccTLD registry. But all ccTLD
users except for Americans clearly understand the significance of ccTLD
contract.


>   The fact that some ccTLD registries are run by academic institutions
>   or non-profits, or even that they have some kind of a governance
>   structure, is really irrelevant -- the bottom line is tat allowing
>   registries to speak for their customers removes the customers from
>   direct effect in ICANN processes.  This is just as true for ccTLDs as
>   it is for gTLDs. 

As I repeatedly pointed out it to you, you don't understand how important
the governance structure of ccTLD is and what local internet community
means in ccTLD scope. In your eyes, ccTLDs are simply one commercial
entity, but in all other countries, ccTLDs are regarded as a social
resource even though its management is privately operated. You shoud
understand that there are many diversified perceptions and ideas on the
character of ccTLDs in the world. And that diversity could not be easily
reduced to such character of commercial registry as .us shows up now. 


>   3) The creation of a (gSO,ccSO) pair will without doubt create
>   confusion and disruption in ICANN structure and authority.  This is
>   almost certainly work to the benefit of suppliers rather than
>   consumers.  As long as there is confusion about authority over DNS
>   policy, registries of all kinds will exploit it.  [The net effect is 
>   that creation of a ccSO will benefit gTLD registries more than it 
>   harms them.]

In this regard, I have a totally different idea from you. 
ccSO would not necessarily support the interests of gTLDs. Rather, ccSO
would provide more locally balanced views on gTLD registries than the
present DNSO that is very unbalanced and prevailed by commercial interest
groups. 


>   4) ICANN may be motivated to form a ccSO because it appears that the 
>   cc's will be more likely to deal with ICANN.  I think this is a 
>   forlorn hope, though -- the difficulties that ICANN faces in dealing 
>   with the cc's stems from the constraints on ICANN from the USG and 
>   other realities, not anything under the direct control of the ICANN 
>   board.  Giving cc's a seat on the board won't make those realities go 
>   away, however much ICANN and the cc's may wish.

More higher level of cc's participation in ICANN would be very helpful to
ICANN itself as well. And contrary to your fixed idea that USG would never
change their predefined policies on ccTLDs, cc's seat on the Board would
affect USG's unfair policies. And that is truly what this community want
to get.


>   5) IMO, the 4 way split of ASO/PSO/DNSO/AtLarge in ICANN should be
>   thought of as primarily a *functional* split, not a *representational*
>   split (though of course the distinction is not sharp).  While the
>   notion of a functional split is subtle, it does provide a meaningful
>   way to divide up the board that doesn't lead to an infinite regress
>   of representational structures (ie, the endless creation of yet more
>   SOs).  [I should note that I consider the ALSO a special case...] The
>   infite creation of SOs is a quite likely result of creating two that 
>   are devoted to *representing* special interests.

No, the original idea was ASO/PSO/DNSO. At Large SO has just been proposed
by ALSC and in my view, its main intention is simply to reduce the concept
of at large users to domain name holders group and to form domain name
holder's Supporting Organization but not at large users' standing group.
Yes, the original idea of ICANN structure was the functional split but not
representational. And here now, ccSO should be a special case because
basically ICANN has no authority or power to make any policy on ccTLDs due
to their own jurisdiction. This fact has been forgotten or ignored by its
original designers of ICANN but now it has been discovered and has to be
confirmed by this community. Don't worry about the infinite regression of
representational structures!  Other structural argument could not have
such a fundamentally special reason as ccTLD SO.


> The cc's as a general class have a interesting position.  On the one hand,
> they were delegated through a process outside their respective
> governments control, and thus, when dealing with their respective
> governments, they use that fact to say "we're private, go away".  On the
> other hand, when it comes to dealing with ICANN, they can say "we are
> under jurisdiction of our local communities, and thus you can't tell us
> what to do".  That is, they avoid public regulation by saying that they
> are private, and avoid any kind of private control by saying that they
> are under the control of their respective "publics". 

You don't understand that government is simply one party to be able to
deal with public affairs and in private sector we have commercial entities
as well as non-commercial entities. Therefore, public things could be
handled with by private entities but not simply by commercial entities. I
think "public coordination" - I don't like to use the term of public
regulation - could be realized by more democratic governance structure of
each ccTLD. And YJ Park's comments on this part of your argument are very
appropriate. Of course, she have never refuted to a list of your specific
points but her short comments shows up that all your arguments are based
on very arbitrary assumptions. I hope you keep more reasonable and
balanced stance.


> The NCC, if it were functional, would provide an international forum
> where non-commercial interests could find common ground in DNS policy. 
> With a ccSO that potential would likely vanish. 

It's simply your very unique prejudice!


> > I would not worry so much about .us as you seem to, in this discussion.
> 
> dot-us is in fact an example that argues directly contrary to chun's
> point -- the .us situation is an argument *for* a strong ICANN, because
> there is essentially no representation of non-commercial interests in
> .us. 

Yes, it is obviously true! Then, I want to hear about some feedbacks on
this account from Rob Courtney, Harold Feld and others who have some
concerns on .us governance structure. I wonder if they would be happy for
your explanation.



Regards,

Chun Eung Hwi
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Chun Eung Hwi
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Seoul Yangchun P.O.Box 81   |   pcs:     (+82) 019-259-2667 
Seoul, 158-600, Korea       | eMail:   ehchun at peacenet.or.kr   
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