<div dir="ltr">On 24 March 2013 22:27, Andrew A. Adams <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:aaa@meiji.ac.jp" target="_blank">aaa@meiji.ac.jp</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">But Evan, you started this by saying that lots of users were diseinfranchised within the GNSO structure</blockquote>
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<br></div><div>No, the disenfranchisement was in general with ICANN. </div><div><br></div><div style>I understand the structure. I get that, as an AC, ALAC has in some ways greater abilities (ie, the mandate to comment on policy and implementation about anything ICANN does, not just gTLDs) than a GNSO constituency, and in some ways lesser (ie, no vote on GNSO council whose decisions can bind the Board).</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>As Avri had mentioned, the structure of GNSO -- (generally speaking) domain sellers in one half, domain buyers in the other -- has been the subject of high-level commentary from the ALAC through the R3 paper. The NPOC has already engaged us on this and I look forward to NCUC engagement as well.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>At this time, the ALAC has a different path into ICANN's decision-making than the GNSO. It gives comment, directly to the Board, staff, public comment processes, inside work groups, wherever appropriate. The the case of the TMCH strawman, Alan and I participated remotely in the LA meeting as did Kathy and Robin. In fact, the four of us had a lively (and cordial!) backchannel in which we were discussing the issues. We didn't agree on everything but broadly did share an abhorrence for the bully tactics being used by name owners and all fought hard against the proposals for prior blocking.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Generally speaking (as was also witnessed in our response to the GAC "scorecard" on the gTLD program), the ALAC took a position that was more conciliatory than the NCSG but stopped (far) short of endorsing the many excesses demanded by the trademark industry. I don't think the current TMCH position is too inconsistent with that middle ground.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>The At-Large response to the Strawman was drafted in early January, and put to a vote which was passed by ALAC with a vote of 14-0-1. It -- and its background material -- are <a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=38045993">all publicly accessible</a> at the ALAC web page. So the ALAC position can be seen clearly, in both its similarities and differences with the NCSG's. (We did not advocate or even envision the "50 variants".)</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Did we support everything that staff ultimately announced? No. But many things that staff wanted to do were OK, and the one thing we really didn't want wasn't done. That's what i thought I'd originally said.</div>
<div><br></div><div><div>The bylaws that I referred to mandate that ALAC gives advice, but don't demand that anyone actually listen to that advice. The GAC, when it gives advice to the Board, *must* be responded to -- not so ALAC. In the many many pieces of explicit policy advice that we've sent out, it seems that much has traditionally seemed to be ignored or discarded, especially when it was at odds with the GNSO. Thus, the disenfranchisement of which I spoke.</div>
<div><br></div><div>In this case, it did seem that our advice -- for once -- actually helped influence the final decision even if the end result was counter to some of the views of some GNSO constituencies. This is the channel that we have. It's more direct than the GNSO's (and WAY more direct than any individual GNSO constituency) and it need not differentiate between policy and implementation. The GNSO's direction is limited to policy, and the line between policy and implementation is an important one whose fuzziness is only now being addressed after what seems like ages of neglect -- in part, as a direct fallout from the TMCH meetings.</div>
</div><div><br></div><div style>The issue is far from over. But I think that one of my main points is that the lack of clarity between policy and implementation hurts both policy and good execution. It has certainly been exploited before, and IMO was at the heart of the current re-opening of the TMCH issue. It enables *both* staff incursion into policy *and* levels of micromanagement that would be intolerable in most conventional organizations, commercial or not. Addressing this is just as critical as the core trademark issues.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Cheers,</div><div style><br></div><div style>- Evan</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
and that therefore dictatorial action by the staff<br>
was justified because the GNSO-based MSM was at base too narrow and therefore<br>
illegitimate. Now, I haven't looked hard enough at ICANN detailed structures,<br>
so please correct me if I'm wrong, but the model is supposed to work like<br>
this:<br>
<br>
GNSO develops policy recommendations through a MSM<br>
<br>
ACs comment on these policy recommendations<br>
<br>
Board adopts policy from GNSO (possibly with minor amendments due to AC<br>
comments) or send it back to GNSO with requests to amend based on their own<br>
input and AC advice.<br>
<br>
Staff implements Board adopted policies.<br>
<br>
<br>
Instead what we have is staff proposing policy, which is sometimes in<br>
agreement with some or all AC's advice. Your statement is that because ALAC<br>
agrees substantially with the current staff policy proposals (*) that ALAC is<br>
fine with this since the GNSO MSM is too narrow and needs someone to act<br>
dictatorially to represent the silent majority.<br>
<br>
I suggested that you try to fix the too-narrow MSM of the GNSO and you<br>
pointed me to the remit of the ACs and ALAC in particular. That's not the<br>
problem here. You are claiming that GNSO is unrepresentative and so staff<br>
should be permitted to make policy. I see no reason to believe that this<br>
would actually give those you claim are currently diseinfranchised from the<br>
GNSO any more influence. Staff policy proposals this time may fit with their<br>
needs expressed through ALAC but staff change, staf are subject to highly<br>
capricious and capturable changes of direction and there is significant lack<br>
of transparency and accountability with staff-driven policy-making processes.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
(*) I'm splitting off the question of ALAC's support for this proposal from<br>
the structural question. See other message.<br>
<span><font color="#888888"><br>
--<br>
Professor Andrew A Adams <a href="mailto:aaa@meiji.ac.jp" target="_blank">aaa@meiji.ac.jp</a><br>
Professor at Graduate School of Business Administration, and<br>
Deputy Director of the Centre for Business Information Ethics<br>
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan <a href="http://www.a-cubed.info/" target="_blank">http://www.a-cubed.info/</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div style="text-align:center"><div style="text-align:left">Evan Leibovitch</div><div style="text-align:left">Toronto Canada</div></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 40px;border:none;padding:0px">
<div style="text-align:center"><div style="text-align:left">Em: evan at telly dot org</div></div><div style="text-align:center"><div style="text-align:left">Sk: evanleibovitch</div></div><div style="text-align:center"><div style="text-align:left">
Tw: el56</div></div></blockquote>
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