<html><head></head><body bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div>I fail to understand why issues such as fraud and copyright protection are the business of ICANN. Isn't that the responsibility of the countries where the registries are based? Likewise take-downs. There need to be protocols, transparency, accountability and recourse to review. For us to suggest take- downs as a solution to anything endorses what is already virtually unregulated procedure that is being over used by rogue national and corporate interests .</div><div><br></div><div>DeeDee</div><div><br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><br>On Jul 23, 2012, at 2:52 PM, Evan Leibovitch <<a href="mailto:evan@TELLY.ORG">evan@TELLY.ORG</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><div></div><blockquote type="cite"><div>On 23 July 2012 13:54, David Cake <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:dave@difference.com.au" target="_blank">dave@difference.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
As far as the issue of charitable names being exploited for fraudulent purposes, as discussed by Evan and Milton - it seems to me, from discussions with the charities, that the *real* solution that the charities need (and not just the ICRC, with its unique legal protections, but ANY charity) is basically a takedown solution like those provided by the APWG etc. Fraud is fraud, we need good solutions to stop fraud - but not only will special rules for the ICRC not have a large effect on fraud targeted against charities in general, it won't even eliminate fraud against the ICRC - much fraud against the ICRC appears to use domain names that don't include the specific protected designations redcross etc, but just variations such as just <a href="http://somethingrc.org" target="_blank">somethingrc.org</a>. If the specific redcross term and other protected designations were protected at the second level, we'd see fraudsters simply switch to less preferred names, such as variations on namerc type 2LD names, and 3LDs and such.</blockquote>
<div><br>Agreed 100%.<br><br>The kind of issue people in ALAC were responding to were the short-term scam sites such as "<a href="http://redcrosshaitirelief.com">redcrosshaitirelief.com</a>", ones that specifically used the charity's name (specifically its conventional Internet 2LD names) inside bogus 2LD strings. As I mentioned in the earlier email, there's also agreement that nothing is special about the Red Cross in this regard, I would consider "<a href="http://unicefhaitifelief.org">unicefhaitifelief.org</a>" or "<a href="http://oxfamhaitirelief.net">oxfamhaitirelief.net</a>" to be just as bad.<br>
<br>As such, I would remind that ALAC has never been in favour of any Red Cross or IOC or IGO restrictions on TLDs -- ever. Some of you may recall that I was in the room near the end of the g-council debate on the issue in San Jose, ready if necessary to detail ALAC's just-passed statement supporting the NCSG position. There is similarly no belief in special treatment for IGOs, *especially* considering that most of them possess the rare qualifications for the exclusive .int TLD already. So our position on gTLDs is still one of no change to existing policy.<br>
<br>Furthermore... I never, in my original comment, suggested that prior restriction -- at any level -- was our direction, only that a legitimate larger issue, buried within the RC/IOC/IGO mess, did bare consideration. We don't claim the answer yet, just ask the question (that indeed does not yet appear to have been asked -- in all these years -- from the PoV of the end user rather than the registrants.) There are many possible approaches, not all of which have had a proper hearing to date. We're totally aware of the limitations of ICANN and domain names, and that removing obviously fraudulent strings won't eliminate phishing or fraud. But it is also wrong to refuse to do anything because no solution can be complete. And denying of scammers the ability to use (clearly) fraudulent domain names impairs their ability to do SEO to increase traffic to their sites.<br>
<br>ICANN's denial of responsibility for cleaning up a problem that its policy enabled (ie, creation of fraudulent domains) simply offers useful ammunition to those who would dispense with the multi-stakeholder model completely, through demonstrating that one significant stakeholder -- the end user being scammed -- is going unheard by the MSM.<br>
<br> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Their is a fundamental difference between the ICRC arguments based on its special legal status, and arguments based on the ICRCs mission and specific operation concerns. The arguments based on the ICRCs special legal status are one thing. But the arguments based on the humanitarian mission and operational concerns of the iCRC could just as easily apply to organisations such as the MSF or UNHCR. I wish a lot more of the effort that has gone into the ICRCs arguments had gone into practical fraud takedown measures that would be applicable to all charitable organisations.<br>
</blockquote><div><br><br>Agreed. IMO, ALAC is seeking to drive this forward in a useful manner, by steering and focusing (rather than outright rejecting) the claims in a manner that benefits the public interest.<br>It would be nice if we could do this together with the NCSG, which is why I'm writing this.<br>
<br></div></div>- Evan<br>
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