Marc, thanks for the good work. I support the contents of this statement.
<br />
I was actually wondering, whether the statement "that there is no
<br />
commercial/noncommercial angle to this issue." is rather too decisive. I do not oppose to that specific statement, but rather wished that I had more time to think about other possibilities in depth. But the dealine has already come, and I thank Marc and Milton and others for putting together this statement.
<br />
<br />
Jisuk
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
-----------------¿ø¹® ¸Þ¼¼Áö-----------------
<br />
<br />
> ¹Þ´Â»ç¶÷ : NCUC-DISCUSS@listserv.syr.edu
<br />
> ÂüÁ¶ :
<br />
> º¸³½³¯Â¥: 2004/01/13 21:37
<br />
> Á¦¸ñ: [NCUC-DISCUSS] Comment today, please: Proposed final statement on gTLD service changes
<br />
> º¸³½»ç¶÷ : Marc Schneiders <marc@SCHNEIDERS.ORG>
<br />
>
<br />
> > Below is the last version of the statement. Comments please fast,
<br />
> since it has to go out to the GNSO council today. Thank you.
<br />
>
<br />
> (I will get the >> out before submission. They serve now to see what
<br />
> changed from the former version.)
<br />
>
<br />
> > NCUC statement on
<br />
> >
<br />
> > "Procedure for use by ICANN in considering requests for consent and
<br />
> > related contractual amendments to allow changes in the architecture
<br />
> > or operation of a gTLD registry."
<br />
> >
<br />
> > NCUC observes that by initiating this procedure, ICANN is assuming
<br />
> > that its contracts alone are not sufficient to provide a predictable and
<br />
> > stable basis for the industry. It is assuming that it needs an ongoing
<br />
> > form of oversight to supplement its contracts and contractual
<br />
> > modifications, because the contracts cannot deal with all possible
<br />
> > developments in the future. Thus, ICANN is expanding into additional
<br />
> > areas of industry regulation, although no one wants to admit that.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > In formulating its response, NCUC begins by asking: How are
<br />
> > noncommercial domain name users specifically affected by this
<br />
> > change? The answer, NCUC believes, is that there is no
<br />
> > commercial/noncommercial angle to this issue. It is more a
<br />
> > question of:
<br />
> >
<br />
> > a) consumer protection; i.e., how users/consumers relate to
<br />
> > suppliers and what kind of regulatory procedures are needed to
<br />
> > protect consumers given the high switching costs associated with
<br />
> > changing registry suppliers after a domain name is well-established.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > b) technical coordination; i.e., what kind of technical regulation or
<br />
> > specifications are needed to protect third parties using domain names
<br />
> > on the Internet from harmful changes made in registry operation, while
<br />
> > preserving as much as possible the freedom of suppliers to respond
<br />
> > to the market and innovate.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > NCUC notes that whether consumers or users are commercial
<br />
> > or noncommercial has little bearing on these issues.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > We also note that a) and b) are distinct policy issues. a) Involves
<br />
> > protection of the parties buying service from a gTLD registry, who
<br />
> > may have options, while b) involves protection of third party users
<br />
> > of a domain name, who probably do not have any options if they
<br />
> > want to connect to the party using the affected registry. We also
<br />
> > note that a) involves economic forms of regulation which also
<br />
> > involves competition policy concerns, while b) is more a matter of
<br />
> > technical coordination.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > NCUC strongly recommends that the PDP distinguish clearly between
<br />
> > a) and b) in its consideration of the new process. Is the object
<br />
> > of the process economic regulation or technical coordination?
<br />
> >
<br />
> > The document we are asked to comment on proposes no policies,
<br />
> > so our comments can only suggest questions or problems for the
<br />
> > PDP process to consider.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > 1. One question the PDP should consider is whether all issues
<br />
> > related to a) above should be handled by national regulatory
<br />
> > authorities instead of ICANN. We support ICANN's need for
<br />
> > technical coordination related to matters under b). We are less
<br />
> > confident of ICANN's ability and right to engage in a). We are also not
<br />
> > convinced of ICANN's ability to engage in competition policy-related
<br />
> > forms of regulation.
<br />
> > We recognize, however, that it may be difficult for consumers to
<br />
> > obtain adequate protection in a transnational business context.
<br />
>
<br />
> Additionally, registries and registrars can and do hide behind their
<br />
> contracts with ICANN. The structure of ICANN's contracts allows a
<br />
> willful registry or registrar to "hide the ball" by pointing to a
<br />
> different contracting party as responsible for the conduct the
<br />
> registrant complains of. Thus, registries maintain that contracts
<br />
> imposed by ICANN bar them from certain courses of action, registrars
<br />
> likewise claim that contract provisions imposed by ICANN prevent them
<br />
> from acting, and ICANN says it is not a regulator and that any remedy
<br />
> lies in the contracts which it claims are negotiated freely. At this
<br />
> moment, when we discuss the introduction of new regulatory procedures,
<br />
> ICANN has to make it clear what its position precisely is vis-a-vis
<br />
> consumer protection. The new procedures developed in this PDP should
<br />
> certainly not worsen the situation described in this paragraph.
<br />
> Ideally they would help avoid situations like the secret deletion of
<br />
> multilingual .org domains by PIR. As things are consumers are trapped
<br />
> between ICANN never approving these domains when Verisign started a
<br />
> 'testbed', ICANN redelegating .org, and PIR that will surely point to
<br />
> its contract, saying that it is not their fault but Verisign's. So
<br />
> thanks to the contractual structure used by ICANN, consumers have no
<br />
> recourse.
<br />
>
<br />
> > While there is a case for a global governance regime, we note that
<br />
> > ICANN invested most of its effort in protecting trademarks and
<br />
> > domain name supplier interests, and has shown very little interest
<br />
> > in protecting consumers and users. For ICANN to become an effective
<br />
> > consumer protection agency significant changes would have to be
<br />
> > made in its representational structure and decision making processes.
<br />
>
<br />
> > 2. The PDP document refers to a "quick look" process followed by
<br />
> > a more involved process if a change fails the "quick look."
<br />
> > A question the PDP needs to face squarely is: What is a subject to
<br />
> > a "quick look" and what is not? What is a "new registry service"?
<br />
> > How is that defined? Who will make that determination initially?
<br />
> > What happens when the registry and ICANN disagree on that issue?
<br />
> > If a process is created, there should be guidelines as to when an issue
<br />
> > is important enough to put it before ICANN bodies, invite public comment
<br />
> > etc. Some issues will be too important to leave to ICANN staff.
<br />
>
<br />
> > 3. The NCUC recognizes the danger that a registry can make
<br />
> > damaging changes, such as in the Sitefinder case. We support
<br />
> > clear, well-defined specifications for registry operation that
<br />
> > make DNS a neutral platform for Internet functions. We also
<br />
> > recognize a threat that innovative changes will be stifled by a
<br />
> > central organization such as ICANN
<br />
> > which may have incentives to prevent useful changes in order to
<br />
> > maintain its control over the industry.
<br />
>
<br />
> > 4. The PDP should consider whether there should be a distinction
<br />
> > between policies applied to sponsored and unsponsored TLDs. NCUC
<br />
> > believes the answer will be usually no. There have
<br />
> to be good reasons to make a distinction. If the
<br />
> justification for regulation is
<br />
> > economic; i.e, that users are locked in to a supplier and cannot switch
<br />
> > service providers without incurring damaging costs, then the same
<br />
> > fundamental economic problem applies regardless of whether the
<br />
> > registry is sponsored or not. In some respects, switching costs are
<br />
> > more serious with sponsored TLDs, since they are supposed to
<br />
> > represent a community identity and not just an individual
<br />
> > company/organization's identity. If the justification for the review
<br />
> > process is technical, the answer is the same: there is no relevant
<br />
> > technical distinction between sponsored and un-sponsored registries.
<br />
> > We do, however, believe that sponsored TLDs could be and should be
<br />
> > required to consult their "community" before making changes in
<br />
> > operation of the sort contemplated by the PDP.
<br />
>
<br />
> > 5. The PDP should consider whether there should be a distinction
<br />
> > between the treatment of dominant and non-dominant TLDs? In this
<br />
> > case NCUC believes there is a stronger case for a distinction. A major
<br />
> > dominant registry may have the power to move the entire industry and
<br />
> > technology, whereas smaller ones would not. However, the lock-in
<br />
> > problem of consumers applies regardless of whether the registry is
<br />
> > dominant or not. As the Internet and DNS grow, larger numbers of
<br />
> > users will be affected by TLD registries regardless of their overall
<br />
> > share of the market. Thus, the policy must identify carefully what
<br />
> > problem it is trying to solve.
<br />
> >
<br />
> > 6. We wish to emphasize that public consultation, and consultation
<br />
> > of constituencies, must be a regular part of dealing with the most
<br />
> > important issues. We do not want ICANN staff to handle substantive
<br />
> > policy issues on their own.
<br />
> >
<br />
>
<br />
><br><br>-----------------------------------------<br>
¿ìÁö¼÷ (Woo, Jisuk)<br>
¼¿ï´ëÇб³ ÇàÁ¤´ëÇпø<br>
Assistant Professor<br>
Graduate School of Public Administration<br>
Seoul National University<br>
tel: 82-2-880-5633 (tel)<br>
fax: 82-2-6248-0951(fax)<br>
email: jisuk@snu.ac.kr<br>
------------------------------------------